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3Abstract
This thesis examines the underlying cause of social stigma towards people
living with HIV, and the extent to which it discourages HIV testing and
treatment. We use a discrete choice model to describe a person’s decision
to seek treatment for HIV (antiretroviral therapy or ART), and estimate
the social cost of seeking treatment using administrative health records
from southern Malawi. We show that seeking ART at a clinic where
many other community members are present carries a significant cost,
even after taking into account clinic quality and location. We investigate
the theoretical effects of policy interventions designed to reduce stigma
and other barriers to care, and demonstrate important complementarities
between such policies. We next evaluate a cluster-randomized informa-
tion experiment in Zomba, Malawi designed to correct a common miscon-
ception: most do not know that ART drugs have a public benefit, that is,
the medication prevents HIV transmission between sexual partners. We
microfound HIV stigma as sexual discrimination between sexual part-
ners, and model the decision to seek an HIV test (and then, if required,
medical treatment) as a signal of infection. We show, theoretically and
empirically, that the randomized information intervention reduces this
type of stigma and significantly increases the rate of HIV testing. The
results demonstrate that social stigma is an important barrier to HIV
testing and treatment, that stigma can be due to rational behavior by
a misinformed public, and that providing new information can be an
effective way to mitigate its effects.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A surprising number of deaths are caused by preventable or treatable
health conditions. Over one million people in sub-Saharan Africa die of
AIDS every year, despite the fact that an effective treatment, antiretroviral
therapy (ART) is now widely provided to patients free of charge. The
medication has large private benefits for those infected with HIV: it pro-
longs life by decades and reverses the symptoms of AIDS. It has recently
been discovered that ART drugs also have a public benefit: they reduce
HIV transmission by 96% (Cohen et al., 2011). This discovery prompted
the World Health Organization to advocate a “Treatment for Prevention”
strategy to bring an end to the AIDS epidemic. Over the past decade, the
supply of free ART has increased dramatically in low-income countries,
yet demand for HIV testing and treatment remain low.
Social stigma is often blamed for low HIV testing rates. However,
neither the extent nor the underlying cause of stigma is well understood.
Many policies which increase HIV testing take stigma into account by
affording clients more privacy, as in door-to-door testing, or obscuring
the signal, for example, by offering monetary incentives to test (Thornton,
2008). Understanding the extent and the nature of stigma is important in
order to better predict the consequences of any policy, including the long-
run impact, the population affected, and the effect on take-up of ART.
Depending on the root causes of stigma, it may also be possible to design
policies which actually reduce the level of stigma in the community,
rather than simply helping people to cope with it.
This thesis consists of three parts: we estimate the social cost of HIV
treatment using a discrete choice model, we evaluate an information
intervention to change beliefs about ART drugs, and we provide empir-
9
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ical evidence for a particular type of HIV stigma explained by statistical
discrimination between sexual partners.
We first propose a discrete choice model to describe the decision to
seek treatment for HIV in the form of ART drugs. In this model, agents
choose between many clinics at varying distances and qualities, or ab-
stain from treatment. We use this model, combined with administrative
health data from southern Malawi, to estimate the total cost of treatment,
including travel costs and the cost of social stigma. We estimate the cost
of stigma, or equivalently, the willingness-to-pay for privacy, by inves-
tigating the tradeoff faced by patients who travel to a further clinic in
order to avoid seeing members of their community. We also determine
the effect of a policy intervention to reduce stigma, reduce travel costs,
or increase quality of care, and discuss complementarities between these
policies. While the cost of stigma is significant, other barriers to care are
larger. In particular, we find that a policy to reduce transport costs is
more effective at increasing ART takeup than a policy to reduce stigma.
We next evaluate a carefully designed information experiment to shift
beliefs about the public benefit of ART drugs. We conduct community
health meetings in 122 villages in Zomba, Malawi, to provide information
on the public benefit of ART: a person taking ART is very unlikely to
spread HIV to his or her sexual partners. We find that a single com-
munity health meeting was highly effective in shifting beliefs about HIV
transmission, even as measured five months after the intervention.
Finally, we illustrate this experiment’s potential to both detect and
reduce one specific type of stigma against those who seek an HIV test:
statistical discrimination by potential sexual partners, based on a rational
fear of HIV transmission. Those who seek an HIV test are more likely
to be infected, and may face rejection from potential partners who fear
contracting the virus. The public benefit of ART drugs implies that,
in fact, an HIV test should not be viewed as a negative signal, since
those who have been tested and treated for HIV are less contagious. We
find that providing precise information, at the community level, on the
public benefit of ART greatly increases the HIV testing rate within only
three months, and we identify a reduction in social stigma as the likely
mechanism. These results suggest that stigma is at least in part due to a
rational fear of contracting HIV, that this type of stigma is a major barrier
to HIV testing, and that correcting wrong beliefs by providing accurate
information can mitigate stigma and its effects.
In order to make precise the form of stigma we have in mind, we
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model HIV testing as a signalling game between potential sexual partners.
The first player decides whether to get tested for HIV, either at a clinic
near his home village, or far away. He is then matched with a potential
sexual partner. She observes his testing decision with some probability,
which depends on his choice of testing location. She forms consistent
beliefs about the risk of contracting HIV, and decides whether to reject or
consent to the match.
Those who are infected with HIV have more to gain from HIV testing,
because it allows them to access ART drugs. This causes a signalling
equilibrium to emerge, in which some fraction of the population reject
matches who have been tested, because they fear contracting HIV. This
behavior contributes to the total level of stigma faced by those who choose
to get tested. An upward shift in beliefs about the public benefit of ART
alleviates stigma if it is based on a fear of HIV transmission, and leaves
other potential forms of stigma unaffected. That is, people are more likely
to consent to matches who have been tested and treated, because they
know that treatment prevents HIV transmission. This reduction in stigma
should, in turn, increase HIV testing.
By mapping the model to an information experiment, we are able to
test several theoretical predictions empirically. We randomly assigned
122 villages in Malawi to either treatment or control status. All villages
received an intervention in which information about ART was dissem-
inated in public, at community health meetings. In treatment villages,
information on both the private and public benefits of ART was provided,
in particular, meeting attendees were informed that ART reduces HIV
transmission by 96%. In the control group we provided information on
only the private benefits of ART.
As the formation of beliefs may depend on endogenous factors such
as education and past health seeking behavior, a randomized experiment
allows us to measure the causal effect of beliefs. We are also interested in
evaluating the information intervention itself, for its potential to inform
policy. There is reason to believe that incorrect beliefs might persist in
equilibrium. First, ART is under-adopted, which means that first-hand
learning is slow. Second, information sharing between social contacts
may be strategic and lack credibility; knowledge about ART may be
viewed as a signal of HIV status, and a potential sexual partner who
claims that ART blocks HIV transmission may have ulterior motives.
Our empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of
the signalling model. Survey measures of stigma towards potential sexual
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partners who are HIV-positive, but treated with ART, were significantly
lower in the treatment group. Health seeking behavior also increased
significantly. The HIV testing rate, as recorded over three months of
administrative data, was 60% higher in treatment villages. Overall, nearly
half of HIV tests take place far away from the HIV testing client’s home
village, but a large shift in beliefs about the public benefit of ART predicts
an increase only in the number of tests sought nearby. The individual test-
ing decision is predicted by one’s perception of the community’s beliefs
about ART, and not by one’s own beliefs; if the results were driven by
altruism, one would expect the opposite.
This thesis is a study on the cause and effect of statistical discrimi-
nation, and its lessons may apply broadly. We show that a technology
which benefits a stigmatized group may be underadopted, and that if
stigma is based on statistical discrimination, correcting wrong beliefs may
diminish stigma and its effects. Arrow (1973)’s seminal work on statistical
discrimination shows that a correlation between individual attributes and
productivity results in labour market discrimination. The theoretical and
empirical effects of this type of discrimination have been investigated in
various contexts1. Much of the literature on social stigma, both in the con-
text of HIV and more generally, views stigma as an exogenous cost2, and
investigates the effects of such a social cost. One exception is Besley and
Coate (1992), in which the authors model stigma toward welfare recipi-
ents as either statistical discrimination or a form of taxpayer resentment,
and investigate the theoretical implications of such a model. In this thesis
we investigate both the source and effect of stigma, theoretically and
empirically, by microfounding stigma as statistical discrimination against
HIV-infected sexual partners, and using an experiment to investigate the
implications for health seeking behavior.
A lack of accurate information may explain the low adoption rates
of many health measures. Providing new, precise information on health
risks has been shown to impact some types of behavior3. Within the
context of HIV, most papers focus on the effect of information4 on risk-
1See for example, Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Coate and Loury (1993).
2In the context of HIV, see Thornton (2008) and Ngatia (2011), and in the context of
welfare payments, and Moffitt (1983).
3See, for example Dupas (2011), Kerwin (2014), Bandiera et al. (2012), Madajewicz
et al. (2007), and Jalan and Somanathan (2008).
4Interventions which provide new, precise information differ sharply from tradi-
tional anti-HIV messaging strategies which focus on behavior change directly. Duflo
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taking (Dupas, 2011, Kerwin, 2014, Bandiera et al., 2012). However, the
type of information which might increase health seeking behavior is not
well understood. Information on the protective benefits of circumcision
appears to have no effect on demand for the procedure (Chinkhumba
et al., 2012, Godlonton et al., 2011). Health seeking behavior may often
be stigmatized, and our results suggest that providing information on the
public benefit of health seeking behavior may effectively reduce the level
of stigma.
Previous experiments by Thornton (2008) and Ngatia (2011) show that
test-seeking responds strongly to small monetary incentives. These exper-
iments also offer effective policy advice in terms of HIV testing. However,
providing monetary incentives for ART take-up may prove infeasible. In
order to obscure the signal, the entire community, and not only ART
patients, would have to be paid to visit the clinic at regular intervals. An
intervention that instead reduces the level of stigma in the community
is attractive for several reasons. Such an intervention should increase
both HIV testing and treatment, and generate persistent effects for a fixed
cost. In addition, we show that stigma is likely to be practiced between
potential sexual partners, which has important implications for policy.
Stigma imposes a high cost on those individuals most concerned with
their sexual prospects, the same individuals who are most at risk of HIV
infection. Designing policy to increase HIV testing and treatment among
this group should be a priority.
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides
background information on antiretroviral therapy and HIV related stigma.
Chapter 3 estimates the cost of social stigma using a discrete choice
model of HIV treatment. Chapter 4 describes an information intervention
we conducted in Malawi, and evaluates its effect on beliefs about HIV
treatment. In Chapter 5 we present a signalling model of HIV testing as a
microfoundation for social stigma, and we test its predictions about HIV
testing using the experiment from Chapter 4. Chapter 6 concludes.
et al. (2012), for example, find that a behavior change program that pushes abstinence
fails to reduce risk-taking among adolescent girls in Kenya.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Antiretroviral Therapy
Antiretroviral therapy, or ART, is a combination of drugs which sup-
press the HIV virus and reverse the progression of AIDS. The medication
dramatically reduces the mortality and morbidity associated with HIV
infection.
ART was developed in the late 1980’s. However, the price of ART
was prohibitively high for the low-income countries most affected by
the AIDS epidemic. Around 2000, multiple agreements between govern-
ments, international organizations, and pharmaceutical companies led
to a large reduction in the price of ART in developing countries. Over
the next decade, HIV patients in Africa receiving ART drugs increased
from 50,000 to 9.7 million, resulting in an approximate 30% decrease in
mortality (WHO, 2013).
While the increased supply of ART has led to a remarkable improve-
ment in outcomes for those infected with HIV, demand for the medication
is surprisingly low. In sub-Saharan Africa, half of the population has
never been tested for HIV, and only one third of those infected are taking
ART drugs (WHO, 2013). There are more than one million AIDS-related
deaths in the region every year, most of which could be prevented by
ART (WHO, 2013).
In addition to providing large health benefits to HIV-positive individ-
uals, ART reduces HIV transmission between sexual partners by reducing
an infected person’s viral load. A large randomized controlled trial1
1This randomized trial was conducted in the field and in low-income countries. The
drug reduced HIV transmission by 96%, measured over a period of a few years, among
14
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recently demonstrated that regular ART use by HIV-positive individuals
reduces HIV transmission by 96% (Cohen et al., 2011). The World Health
Organization and others have called for a “treatment for prevention”
strategy, advocating ART use specifically for the purpose of preventing
new infections. Epidemiological models suggest that in light of the public
benefit of ART, universal testing and treatment could bring an end to the
AIDS epidemic within 50 years, and would be cost-effective in the long
run (Granich et al., 2009).
In most countries the criteria used to determine whether a person
qualifies for ART are based on guidelines from the World Health Organi-
zation, which have changed over time. As of 2013 these guidelines stip-
ulate that one should qualify for ART when the disease has progressed
beyond a certain point, as measured by the severity of symptoms and a
blood test. In addition, pregnant women, children under the age of five,
and those with partners who are HIV negative should always qualify2.
2.2 Stigma Against HIV Testing and Treatment
Social stigma, according to the seminal definition by Goffman (1963),
is “the phenomenon whereby an individual with an attribute which is
deeply discredited by his/her society is rejected as a result of the at-
tribute.” There are various potential reasons for such a rejection. Stigma
could be based on statistical discrimination, it could be due to a distaste
for social interactions with individuals having a particular attribute, or it
could arise as an equilibrium of social behavior (Peski and Szentes, 2013).
Because HIV is transmitted through sexual interactions, it is partic-
ularly susceptible to many forms of social stigma3. This in turn might
partly explain why testing levels are low across sub-Saharan Africa, and
couples who took the drug at home, unobserved, and in general in a similar manner to
most ART patients in the developing world. In particular, this reduction in transmission
does not hinge on perfect adherence to the medication. It is accurate to say that ART
drugs reduce HIV transmission by at least 96% relative to the absolute transmission
rate over any time period up to approximately ten years. The absolute transmission
rate is low, so the the total reduction in transmission over repeated interactions is
approximately linear.
2The extent to which these guidelines are put into policy varies. In Malawi, for
example, as of 2013 those with partners who are HIV negative did not automatically
qualify
3See Mahajan et al. (2008) for a review of medical and sociological research on the
stigmatization of HIV and AIDS.
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in Malawi, where our study takes place. For example, an equilibrium
may emerge in which individuals wish to disassociate themselves from
others who have engaged in sexual behavior that is deemed socially
unacceptable (Ngatia, 2011). Stigma may also take the form of pure
statistical discrimination: a person might reject sexual partners who are
HIV-positive out of a rational fear of infidelity or HIV transmission. The
correlation between HIV status and HIV testing implies that any stigma
towards those who are HIV-positive may also apply to test-seekers.
In order to obtain ART drugs, a person must first seek an HIV test.
While the results of an HIV test are private4, the decision to test may
be observable. The availability of ART drugs induces adverse selection
among test seekers; for example, in Malawi, true HIV prevalence is 44%
higher among those who report having been tested (DHS, 2010). The fact
that seeking an HIV test is associated with HIV infection may generate
stigma, which in turn discourages HIV testing; in Malawi, 27% of women
and 48% of men report never having been tested for HIV (DHS, 2010).
In addition, our data shows that 30% of HIV tests do not take place at
a nearby health facility, which could be explained by a desire to avoid
being seen.
Previous work by Thornton (2008) show that test-seeking responds
strongly to small monetary incentives, which conceal a person’s true
motivation for testing, suggests that stigma may play a role in HIV testing
decisions. Ngatia (2011), using a field experiment, finds evidence for a
model of HIV testing in which the level of stigma a person faces depends
on not only his own testing decision but also on the testing decisions of
his social contacts. In that model, stigma is based on social distaste for
an underlying risk type, that is, the moral judgment of those who engage
in risky behavior. Finally, Hoffmann et al. (2014) use a lab experiment in
Kenya to show that people are willing to forgo payment to avoid coming
into contact with an object handled by an HIV positive person, and that
this behavior is only partly explained by a misunderstanding of contagion
risk.
The Malawian Journals Project5 provides extensive qualitative evi-
dence on the nature of HIV-related stigma. The project has transcribed a
vast amount of hearsay data on attitudes towards HIV, and these journals
4In Malawi, non-joint HIV tests are confidential, and a person who tests HIV nega-
tive does not receive any written proof of the result. The test is conducted twice with
different test kits, so an incorrect diagnosis is unlikely.
5http://malawi.pop.upenn.edu/malawi-data-qualitative-journals
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include many examples of stigma towards HIV testing and treatment,
especially in the dating market. Many express dismay at the widespread
availability of ART, as the medication makes HIV-positive individuals
appear healthy and therefore harder to identify. Others report seeking
HIV testing and treatment far from home, to avoid being seen and then
rejected by potential sexual partners. Consider, for example, the following
two quotes from the Malawi Journals Project.
“Most of the people here in Balaka do prefer to go and get tested at Dream
clinic because it is an outskirt place where they cannot be seen by those people
who know them.”
“It’s better to receive drugs from the hospital of some areas [...] because many
people can discover fast that I have virus of AIDS, and some ladies can disagree
me so it can be painful in my everyday life.”
Chapter 3
A Discrete Choice Model of
Health Behavior
If HIV testing and treatment are subject to social stigma, people who
seek HIV-related care will be willing to pay a price to avoid being seen
by members of their community. In this chapter, we use a discrete choice
model to estimate this cost of stigma and quantify the potential effects
of policy interventions designed to reduce stigma and other barriers to
treatment.
In Malawi, an HIV positive person taking antiretroviral therapy (ART)
must visit a health facility approximately every two months to refill his or
her prescription. The patient can choose between many health facilities,
both rural and urban, at varying distances from their home village. ART
drugs are often distributed through a particular office, and patients must
wait in line to see the health worker. If the clinic is frequented by many
other village members seeking general medical care, an ART patient risks
running into someone he or she knows, and having his HIV status re-
vealed.
In the absence of social stigma, we would expect an ART patient to
make his or her choice based on the distance and quality of the health
facility. If there is a social cost to seeking HIV-related care, the probability
of seeing another person from the same village will enter into a person’s
choice. The fear of being “found out” will affect both the choice of
whether to seek ART drugs, and which clinic to visit.
We propose a discrete choice model of health seeking behavior. In-
dividuals with HIV have a choice of many clinics at varying distances,
and choose a particular clinic (or to abstain from treatment) to maximize
18
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utility, taking into account distance, quality, and behavior of other mem-
bers of the same village. In order to estimate the willingness-to-pay for
privacy, we take inspiration from Kremer et al. (2011), who use travel-
cost based revealed preference estimates to estimate willingness-to-pay
for clean drinking water. We also use our model to examine the effects of
several potential policy interventions.
We estimate this model using a large dataset of all existing ART pa-
tients from 244 villages in Zomba, Malawi, and administrative data from
all 15 ART distributing health facilities within reasonable travel distance
from those villages. We show that distance and quality are significant
factors in a person’s decision to seek treatment. We also show that, on
average, patients are willing to pay a significant price to avoid being seen
by members of their village who visit the clinic for general health care,
consistent with our theory that HIV-related health care is stigmatized.
We find that the overall effect of a policy to reduce stigma is limited
due to other substantial barriers to treatment. In particular, a policy to
reduce travel costs or improve quality of care would have a large effect
on ART uptake, and the largest gains would be made from a policy that
reduces stigma while simultaneously removing other barriers to care.
3.1 Model of Clinic Choice
We model a situation in which HIV-positive individuals choose whether
or not to seek treatment in the form of ART drugs, and which clinic
to visit for treatment. Following McFadden’s conditional logit model of
discrete choice, (McFadden et al., 1973), for each individual, we define a
utility function which depends on both his or her individual character-
istics and on the features of the potential choice of clinic. Each person’s
choice will depend on his or her HIV status (those without HIV cannot
choose to seek treatment), the various costs of visiting each clinic, includ-
ing distance and social stigma, and the benefits of each clinic, including
the value of treatment and the quality of the clinic.
The prevalence of HIV in village j is denoted h¯j, and the population
prevalence is denoted h¯. Each individual i in village j has private type
hij ∈ {0, 1} (with E(hij) = h¯j) which represents his or her HIV status.
Those with hij = 0 do not have the choice of seeking treatment for HIV.
Those with hij = 1 have the choice of visiting one of K clinics to seek
ART drugs, or abstaining from treatment. The fact that individuals have
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different choice sets marks a departure from McFadden’s model.
A patient i from village j who chooses clinic k ∈ 1, ..., K, or chooses to
abstain from treatment, k = 0, receives utility
uijk = Vijk + eijk. (3.1)
where Vijk captures all of the observable costs and benefits of seeking
treatment at clinic k, relative to abstaining from treatment, and eijk is an
error term. In particular, for k > 0,
Vijk = βV + βDDjk + βGNGjk + β
ANAjk + Qk + β
χTχijk (3.2)
where βV is a constant representing the perceived value of receiving
treatment. Djk is the distance in kilometers between village j and clinic k,
and the coefficient βD captures the utility cost of travel. Qk is a dummy
variable which represents the quality of clinic k. χijk is a vector containing
other regressors which could include individual or village characteristics,
or interactions such as whether a village has a formal relationship with a
particular clinic.
The terms NGjk and N
A
jk represent the expected number of other people
from the same village visiting clinic k on a given day for general health
care or ART drugs respectively. The coefficients βG and βA, if negative,
capture the cost of social stigma, that is, the cost of being seen at the clinic
by a (general or ART) patient from one’s own village. If positive, these
coefficients capture the benefit of going to the clinic on the same day as
other community members.
For a person who does not seek treatment (k = 0),
Vij0 = 0. (3.3)
3.1.1 Distributional Assumption
The error term eijk (for k = 0, 1, 2, ...K) is assumed to be independently
and identically distributed with an extreme value distribution:
F(eijk) = e−e
−eijk . (3.4)
This is the assumption behind the multinomial logit model, and gener-
ates a closed-form solution for the likelihood function. This assumption
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also normalizes the variance of the error term to pi2/6, which in turn
normalizes the overall scale of utility.
3.1.2 Choice Behavior
An HIV-negative person must choose k = 0. An HIV-positive person
will choose option k if it generates the largest possible utility out of all
options (including the option to abstain, k = 0). The probability that an
HIV-positive person chooses k is equal1 to
P(uijk ≥ uijk′ ∀k′ |hij = 1) = e
Vijk
∑Kk′=0 e
Vijk′
. (3.5)
Therefore, the unconditional probability that a person chooses to seek
ART at clinic k is equal to
pijk = h¯j
eVijk
∑Kk′=0 e
Vijk′
. (3.6)
The unconditional probability that a person in village j does not seek
ART is equal to the probability that he is HIV-negative, 1− h¯j, plus the
probability that he is positive, h¯j, but that abstaining from treatment
maximizes his utility:
pij0 = (1− h¯j) + h¯j 1
∑Kk′=0 e
Vijk′
. (3.7)
3.2 Empirical Estimation
In this section, we describe our estimation of the multinomial logit model
using administrative health records from Malawi.
3.2.1 Setting and Data
Our empirical setting is Zomba District, Malawi. In Southern Malawi,
HIV prevalence is approximately 14.5% (DHS, 2010). Antiretroviral ther-
apy (ART) is available at more than 20 rural clinics, and is provided free
1This probability is obtained by integrating the indicator function I(uijk ≥ uijk′ ∀k′)
times the probability density function of the extreme value distribution.
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of charge. Clinics which dispense ART also treat patients for a wide
variety of general health conditions. The study area covers two areas, TA
Chikowi and TA Mwambo, within Zomba District. These areas are served
by 15 ART-dispensing health facilities, and the average distance from a
rural village to an ART-dispensing clinic is approximately 5 kilometers.
In Malawi, ART is only provided to pregnant women, symptomatic pa-
tients, and patients with a high viral load (as measured by a CD4 count).
However, these requirements rarely bind, as the vast majority of new
ART patients are well beyond the CD4-count thresholds put forth in the
Ministry of Health guidelines.
We use administrative data2 from all 15 ART-dispensing clinics, con-
taining the universe of ART patients in 2013. For each patient, we can
identify the patient’s age, gender, choice of clinic (with GPS coordinates),
and home village. We restrict attention to the 244 villages with unique
names in the District, as identified by the Malawian National Census. We
combine the National Census data with the health administrative data to
construct a dataset of all adults in those 244 villages, including gender,
whether or not the person was taking ART drugs in 2013, and if they
were, their choice of clinic, and the straight-line distance between the
village and the clinic.
In order to measure general patient clinic attendance, we visited each
ART dispensing clinic and digitized the general out-patient registers,
which include a patient’s home village. We collected two months worth
of data: November and March.
3.2.2 Summary Statistics
The prevalence of HIV in Southern Malawi is approximately 14.5%, and
the rate of infection is higher among women (17%) than men (12%) (DHS,
2010). However, only 4.8% of the adult population in our data were ART
patients in 2013. ART use is nearly three times higher among women
(7.4%) than men (2.6%), a fact which is not fully explained by the dif-
ference in prevalence, but may be explained by health policy: pregnant
women are encouraged to get tested and treated for HIV because ART
prevents transmission from mother to child.
The majority of ART patients do not attend the nearest clinic to their
2This data was digitized as part of the routine data collection practices of Canadian
NGO Dignitas International.
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village: 62% of men and 52% of women travel further than necessary to
seek ART. This may be explained by differences in clinic quality, but ART-
related care is highly standardized across Zomba District. According to
the medical team at health care NGO Dignitas International, ART is the
one medication which is never out of stock at any dispensing clinic in
Zomba. For this reason, we view the extra distance traveled as suggestive
of social stigma. The fact that so many are willing to travel further than
necessary for ART motivates the analysis that follows, in which we more
carefully disentangle clinic quality from stigma.
3.2.3 Estimation
We use simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the vector of param-
eters β and clinic fixed effects {Qk} in equation 3.2. The only additional
regressor, χjk is an indicator for whether village j is in the catchment area
of clinic k, that is, whether clinic k is formally recommended to villagers
for health programming, pre-natal visits, etc. We also estimate the village-
level HIV rates h¯j, applying the constraint3 1JΣjhˆj = h¯ = 0.145, where
hˆj is the maximum likelihood estimate of h¯j, and h¯ = 0.145 is the HIV
prevalence in Zomba district (DHS, 2010). We also constrain hˆj ∈ [0, 1]
for all j.
From our administrative data on ART patients, we are able to calculate
the approximate daily rate of ART visits at clinic k attendance from village
j, NAjk . From the general patient rosters, we are able to calculate the
approximate daily rate of general clinic k attendance from village j, NGjk .
3.3 Results
3.3.1 The Costs of Treatment and Travel
The results of the simulated maximum likelihood estimation are dis-
played in Table 3.1. The value of seeking treatment, βV , is positive and
significant. This is not an obvious result. While ART drugs offer large
benefits, those benefits are only apparent once a person has started to
experience the symptoms of AIDS. This takes approximately ten to fifteen
3By the law of large numbers, the average village-level rate of HIV should equal the
population prevalence. This constraint helps us interpret our parameter estimates hˆj
correctly within the model.
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years from the time of HIV infection. On the other hand, a person taking
ART drugs bears costs not captured in the time it takes to reach a clinic.
Even if the clinic is in the patient’s village, he or she will need to visit the
clinic every two months, and wait to see and speak to a health worker.
He will be under pressure from that health worker to remember to take
the medication every day 4. ART drugs carry some side effects, which are
mild relative to the symptoms of AIDS, but are still a burden.
As expected, the utility from a clinic visit is significantly decreasing
in distance. Utility is significantly lower if the village is not in the clinic’s
catchment area, even controlling for distance, which suggests that formal
policy links with a clinic are important.
3.3.2 The Cost of Stigma
Interestingly, there does not appear to be social stigma among ART pa-
tients. In fact, βA is positive and significant, suggesting that ART patients
from the same village prefer to visit the same clinic. This result may be
subject to Manski’s reflecton problem: it could be that some common
shock encourages villagers from the same village to choose the same
ART clinic. However, this shock would need to be village-clinic specific,
since we control for clinic quality in our specification and we estimate the
total rate of ART use in the village, and would have to be unrelated to
formal policy links between villages and clinics, as we control for clinic
catchment area.
We find that social stigma from general clinic patients is important:
βG is negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests
that a patient is willing to travel 2.76 extra kilometers to avoid seeing one
additional member of their village who is at a clinic for general health
care.
We use the results of the incentive experiment conducted by Thornton
(2008) to estimate willingness-to-pay for privacy. In Thornton (2008), in-
dividuals in Malawi were offered incentives of varying amounts to collect
HIV test results at randomly-placed centers near their villages. Thornton
(2008) argues that those receiving any incentive were not subject to social
stigma, since the incentives provided clear plausible deniability: even
those who were unlikely to have HIV would visit the clinic to collect their
4Proper adherence to ART is encouraged in order to prevent the emergence of ART-
resistant strains of the virus.
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Table 3.1: Clinic Choice for ART Patients
Utility function
parameters
βV (value of ART) 1.500***
(0.295)
βD (distance to clinic) -0.138***
(0.016)
βA (number of ART patients from same village) 1.795***
(0.252)
βG (number of general patients from same village) -0.381**
(0.162)
βχ (outside catchment area) -1.480***
(0.266)
Clinic (k) Predicted Share -
Actual Share
No treatment (k = 0) -0.0005
BLM (k = 1) 0.0000
Chamba (k = 2) -0.0001
Lambulira (k = 3) -0.0001
Likangala (k = 4) -0.0001
Magomero (k = 5) 0.0000
Makwapala (k = 6) 0.0000
Matawale (k = 7) 0.0000
Matiya (k = 8) -0.0001
Mayaka (k = 9) 0.0000
Namikango (k = 10) 0.0000
Nasawa (k = 11) 0.0001
Police College (k = 12) 0.0000
Pirimiti (k = 13) 0.0006
Thondwe (k = 14) 0.0001
Zomba Central Hospital (k = 15) 0.0002
Clinic fixed effects Yes
Obs (Individuals) 53,230
Administrative data from 15 health facilities offering ART. Patient data from 244 villages
in Zomba District includes all existing ART patients in 2013 and two months of data
for general health patients. Estimation is constrained simulated MLE. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level and given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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payment. Conditional on any incentive offered, the marginal effect of
increasing the size of the incentive by $0.41 USD5 was found to equal
the marginal disincentive of needing to travel one additional kilometer to
reach the center. In that paper, the cost of travel was slightly lower than
our estimates (though almost identical to the estimates we will obtain
for general health patients, in Section 3.4.1). This may be because ART
patients find it harder to travel, or because they recognize some switching
costs: traveling to a distant clinic once for ART means having to keep trav-
eling that distance every couple of months. We adjust our cost estimate
to take this difference in travel costs into account, and set one kilometer
of travel for ART equal to $0.53.
Applying those estimates to our setting, we find that on average, an
ART patient is willing to pay $1.47 to avoid seeing one person from their
own village on a given visit. For the average person considering ART
treatment, there will be average of 0.21 others from their village seeking
general health care at the nearest clinic on a given day. The total cost
of stigma faced by the average person at their nearest clinic is therefore
$0.31. Because ART patients need to visit the clinic approximately 6 times
per year, this works out to an annual cost of $1.86, or approximately 3
days’ income6. This may help explain why most ART patients do not
choose the nearest clinic for treatment.
Our estimates may understate the level of stigma for two reasons. First
of all, we base the rate of general clinic attendance on only two months’
worth of data, so the regressor is measured with error. Second, Zomba
Central Hospital in the city of Zomba is the most preferred option, and
is not the nearest clinic to any village. One reason the hospital may be
preferred is the perceived anonymity of receiving health care in a big
hospital in a city. In addition, HIV testing and treatment are conducted
in a separate wing of Zomba Central Hospital, which may afford more
privacy than a rural clinic. These effects are difficult to disentangle from
other measures of quality.
3.4 Policy
In the previous section, we calculated the private cost of HIV-related
stigma on ART patients. However, ART use has many positive externali-
5Dollar amounts are adjusted to 2014 USD.
6According the the World Bank, Malawi’s GNI per capita was $250 in 2014.
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ties, including economic externalities generated by a healthy and produc-
tive person living with HIV, as well as epidemiological externalities: ART
drugs prevent both mother-to-child HIV transmission and HIV transmis-
sion between sexual partners.
For these reasons, policy makers may be interested in increasing the
total rate of ART use in the population. In this section, we will investigate
the effect of policies which reduce costs associated with ART use, includ-
ing stigma and travel costs. We are able to use our estimated utility func-
tion (Table 3.1) to make predictions about the effects of policy changes
that affect the parameters β and {Qk}. By calculating the predicted share
of the population that chooses k = 0 under various counterfactuals, we
can investigate the effect of a policy change on rates of ART use.
In order to conduct policy experiments related to travel costs and im-
provements in clinic quality, we must recognize that such policy changes
will impact both the decision to seek ART and the decision to seek general
health care. For this reason, we expect to find a complementary effect
between a reduction in stigma and a reduction in travel costs. To this
end, we must begin by examining the decision to seek general health
care.
3.4.1 General Health Care Choices
In order to understand how a person chooses whether and where to seek
general health care, we again turn to McFadden’s conditional logit model.
We estimate clinic quality for general health care (which may be different
from clinic quality for ART), and the effect of distance. We estimate the
model using data from general patient rosters at the same set of clinics
we used in the ART analysis, as described in Section 3.2.1. Full details
of the model and estimation are available in the Appendix (3.A), and the
results appear in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 shows that in a given two month period, most people do not
need to visit a clinic for general health care (the average value of care
is negative), that people are significantly more likely to visit a clinic if
their village is in the catchment area, and that travel costs are significant.
Any policy to reduce travel costs will therefore increase visits for general
health care, and therefore increase stigma.
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Table 3.2: Clinic Choice for General Patients
Utility function
parameters
βV (value of health care) -0.829***
(0.222)
βD (distance to clinic) -0.105***
(0.019)
βχ (outside catchment area) -2.069***
(0.162)
Clinic fixed effects Yes
Obs (Individuals) 53,230
Administrative data from 18 health facilities offering general care. Patient data from
244 villages in Zomba District includes two months of data for general health patients.
Estimation is simulated MLE. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and given
in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
3.4.2 Elimination of Stigma
A natural first counterfactual to investigate is the elimination of social
stigma. Of course, the elimination of stigma is not in and of itself a policy.
However, policymakers spend considerable energy devising programs
which are more or less effective in this endeavor. There is evidence,
for example, that monetary incentives reduce stigma (Thornton, 2008).
In Chapter 5, we show that information on the public benefits of ART
can also significantly reduce stigma. While programs to improve patient
privacy do not reduce the level of stigma itself, they are designed to
reduce its cost. In this section, we investigate the maximum potential
gain from such policies.
If ART patients did not experience social stigma from other village
members, they would not face a cost from seeing other village members
at the clinic, and the coefficient βG would equal zero. In order to calculate
the rate of ART use in the absence of social stigma, we must recalculate
the predicted share of the total population that would seek ART drugs,
using estimates βG = 0 and the new predicted values of the variable NAjk ,
which represents the number of other ART patients from the same village,
at the same clinic on a given day.
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The elimination of stigma on its own does not cause a large increase
in ART use. In fact, with no other policy changes in place, the rate of
ART use among HIV positive people would increase from 33% to 35%, a
6% proportional increase. This effect size is fairly small for two reasons.
First, while the cost of stigma at the nearest clinic is high for many people,
many have the option of traveling to another clinic which is not much
further but at which the cost of stigma is low. Second, as we shall see in
the following sections, travel costs are much larger barriers to ART use,
and reducing both travel costs and stigma would be more effective than
reducing only one or the other.
3.4.3 Travel Costs
A reduction in travel costs should affect ART use through several chan-
nels. First, lower travel costs should increase treatment directly, by mak-
ing it easier for patients to reach the clinic. They should also increase
ART use indirectly, as patients prefer to travel to the clinic together.
Travel costs may also decrease ART use due to stigma: lower travel
costs will increase attendance at clinics for general health care. However,
this is mitigated by the fact that it is now easier for patients to travel
further to avoid stigma from other community members.
Let us investigate a policy which reduces travel costs by fifty percent.
This policy increases total general health clinic visits by 13%, and will
therefore surely lead to an increase in the cost of social stigma. In fact,
the total effect on ART use is positive: ART use from 33% to 56%, a 70%
proportional increase. Even in the presence of stigma, reducing travel
costs has a much larger effect on ART use than a policy to reduce stigma.
We might expect to find a complementarity between reducing travel
costs and reducing stigma. Because lower travel costs increase the burden
from stigma, a policy which both reduces stigma and travel costs would
be more effective than a policy that does only one or the other.
Suppose we implement a policy that both eliminates social stigma
and reduces travel costs by 50%. This will increase general health care
visits, but such visits will no longer impose a negative externality on
ART patients. From a baseline level of 33%, such a policy would increase
ART use to 58% of the HIV positive population. The effects of stigma and
transport cost reduction are approximately additive.
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3.4.4 Clinic Quality
We investigate a policy which improves clinic quality for all patients, and
increases the benefit to patients by $2 (approximately 3 days’ income)7.
Reducing wait times, providing a greater variety of good medication,
and increasing the number or skills of staff would all qualify as increases
in clinic quality. Some other policies would have an identical effect to an
increase in clinic quality. For example, increasing information about the
benefits of health care, and in particular, the benefits of ART would be
isomorphic to an increase in the quality of service.
If the quality of general care increases by $2, as measured by increased
utility for the patient, general health care attendance at clinics will in-
crease by 40%. If the quality of ART provision increases by the same
amount, the total increase in ART use may be expected to increase due
to the direct effect of quality, but may also decrease due to stigma from
additional general care patients at the clinic. We estimate ART use to
increase from 33% to 53%.
In contrast, if only the level of ART service increases, while general
health care quality stays constant, ART rises slightly higher to 54% be-
cause there is no additional stigma burden from an increase in general
health patients.
Finally, there is a complementarity between eliminating stigma and
increasing clinic quality. If we increase clinic quality for either ART pa-
tients or all patients, and at the same time eliminate social stigma, ART
use will increase from 33% to 56%.
The complementarity between stigma and clinic quality is stronger
than the complementarity between stigma and travel costs. When travel
costs decrease, ART patients face a higher stigma burden from the cor-
responding increase in general health care patients, however, this is mit-
igated by the fact that it is now easier to travel even further to avoid
seeing neighbors from the same village. Clinic quality improvements also
increase the stigma burden, but do not make it any easier to travel far for
ART drugs.
7We again use the calibration from (Thornton, 2008) in which one additional kilome-
ter of travel for general health care is worth $0.41, and use this calculation to add $0.68
in utility to overall clinic quality.
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3.A Appendix: Discrete Choice Model for Gen-
eral Care
In this appendix, we estimate a discrete choice model of general health
seeking behavior.
In Malawi, general health care is provided at many rural and urban
health facilities. Services include pre and post-natal exams and advice,
infant health care, prescriptions for pain medication, antibiotics and con-
traception, anti-malarial treatment, wound care, and many other services.
Each village is in the catchment area of one particular clinic, yet village
members are free to visit any health facility. Within the geographic areas
included in this study (TA Mwambo and TA Chikowi in Zomba District),
there are 17 rural health facilities and one urban hospital: Zomba Central
Hospital.
In our discrete choice model, each person can choose between many
clinics at varying quality and distance, and if in need of health care, may
choose a particular clinic to maximize utility. We estimate the model
using a dataset of general health patients from 244 villages in Zomba,
Malawi, and administrative data from all 18 health facilities8 in the area.
We find that distance and quality are significant factors in a person’s
decision to seek general health care. We model a situation in which indi-
viduals choose whether or not to seek health care, and which clinic to visit
for treatment. As in Chapter 3, we follow McFadden’s conditional logit
model of discrete choice, (McFadden et al., 1973). For each individual, we
define a utility function which depends on the features of the potential
choice of clinic and the person’s home village.
3.A.1 Model
A person i from village j who chooses clinic k ∈ 1, ..., K, or chooses to
abstain from medical care, k = 0, receives utility
uijk = Vijk + eijk. (3.8)
where Vijk captures all of the observable costs and benefits of seeking
general health care at clinic k, relative to not seeking care, and eijk is an
8There are 18 health facilities in the area, 15 of which distribute ART.
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error term. In particular, for k > 0,
Vijk = βV + βDDjk + Qk + βχTχijk (3.9)
where βV is a constant representing the perceived value of receiving
treatment. Djk is the distance in kilometers between village j and clinic k,
and the coefficient βD captures the utility cost of travel. Qk is a dummy
variable which represents the quality of clinic k. χijk is a vector containing
other regressors which could include individual or village characteristics,
or interactions such as whether a village has a formal relationship with a
particular clinic.
For a person who does not seek general health care (k = 0),
Vij0 = 0. (3.10)
The error term eijk (for k = 0, 1, 2, ...K) is again assumed to be inde-
pendently and identically distributed with an extreme value distribution:
F(eijk) = e−e
−eijk . (3.11)
An person will choose option k if it generates the largest possible
utility out of all options (including the option to abstain, k = 0). The
probability that a person chooses k is equal9 to
P(uijk ≥ uijk′ ∀k′ |hij = 1) = e
Vijk
∑Kk′=0 e
Vijk′
. (3.12)
The probability that a person chooses option k is equal to
pijk =
eVijk
∑Kk′=0 e
Vijk′
. (3.13)
3.A.2 Empirical Estimation
In this section, we describe our estimation of the multinomial logit model
using administrative health records from Malawi.
In order to measure general patient clinic attendance, we visited all
eighteen health facilities in the study area and digitized the general out-
patient registers, which include a patient’s home village. We collected
9This probability is obtained by integrating the indicator function I(uijk ≥ uijk′ ∀k′)
times the probability density function of the extreme value distribution.
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two months worth of data. The average rate of clinic attendance among
adults is 4.5% per month. 62.5% of patients attend either their nearest
clinic or the clinic whose catchment area they belong to.
We use simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the vector of pa-
rameters β and clinic fixed effects {Qk} in equation 3.9. The only addi-
tional regressor, χjk is an indicator for whether village j is in the catch-
ment area of clinic k, that is, whether clinic k is formally recommended
to villagers for health programming, pre-natal visits, etc.
3.A.3 Results
The results of the estimation appear in Chapter 3, in Table 3.2. The
average value of care is negative, since in a given two-month period most
people do not require medical care. People are significantly more likely
to visit a clinic if their village is in the catchment area, and travel costs
are significant.
Chapter 4
An Information Intervention
In response to the AIDS epidemic, international organizations have put
much effort into spreading information about HIV prevention, focusing
on abstinence, faithfulness, and condom use as effective measures. Edu-
cation efforts worldwide have exaggerated the risk of transmission in an
effort to encourage a reduction in risk-taking (Kerwin, 2014). Perhaps as a
result, misconceptions about HIV transmission are widespread. The rate
of HIV transmission, for example, is often overestimated by the general
population. The true incidence is less than 1% per sexual interaction, yet
average beliefs have been measured as higher than 80% in both Malawi
and Burundi (Kerwin, 2014, Sterck, 2013).
In this section, we focus on a second misconception. We find that
in our sample of Malawian adults, most respondents are unaware of
the fact that a person who is successfully treated for HIV is unlikely to
spread the virus to sexual partners. In particular, antiretroviral therapy
(ART) reduces HIV transmission by upwards of 96% (Cohen et al., 2011).
Providing information about this link between ART and HIV prevention
may increase demand for HIV testing and treatment through various
channels. An altruistic person who is likely to have HIV would have
a greater incentive to seek testing and treatment in order to protect his
or her partner or the wider community. The fact that ART prevents HIV
transmission may result in a reduction in stigma at the community level
(discussed in more detail in the following chapter). Finally, a person who
is likely to have HIV may experience an increase in pressure from sexual
partners or other members of the community to seek treatment in order
to prevent HIV transmission.
In this chapter, we describe an information intervention to change
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beliefs about the effect of ART on HIV transmission. We use data from a
follow-up survey five months after the intervention to evaluate its effect
on beliefs, and show that a single community health meeting is sufficient
to change beliefs related to HIV transmission. We will also investigate
the spread of information within communities. We discuss whether char-
acteristics of the health educator, such as gender, background, education
and identity are important in their ability to transmit knowledge. Finally,
we will investigate heterogeneous effects of the information campaign
based on education, gender, age and income.
4.1 Setting and Randomization
This chapter evaluates an experiment which took place in Zomba District,
Malawi. Malawi is representative of Southern Africa in terms of its
relatively high rate of HIV infection, and recent but widespread access
to ART drugs. In Zomba District, HIV prevalence is approximately 14.5%
(DHS, 2010), and both HIV testing and antiretroviral therapy (ART) are
available for free at more than 20 rural clinics.
The study area covers two areas, TA Chikowi and TA Mwambo (see
Figure 4.1), within Zomba District. We include only villages with unique
names in the district, which enables us to identify the study villages in
administrative clinic data. From this set, we selected a random sample
of 122 villages, which we randomly assigned to either the treatment or
control group, stratifying on population and nearest health facility. The
sample is balanced on observable village characteristics (see Table 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Study area
The study included 122 villages in Zomba District, Malawi, represented by blue dots.
Administrative data was obtained from 18 health facilities, represented by red squares.
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Table 4.1: Balance on Village-Level Covariates
(1) (2) (3)
Control Treatment (1) vs. (2),
p-value
% of target† group tested for HIV pre-intervention 1.302 0.902 0.152
% of men in target† group tested for HIV pre-intervention 1.149 0.801 0.239
% of target† group tested jointly pre-intervention 0.252 0.126 0.145
% of target† group tested far away pre-intervention 0.548 0.403 0.327
% of target† group tested positive pre-intervention 0.205 0.137 0.223
% tested for HIV pre-intervention 1.213 1.050 0.308
% initiated ART pre-intervention 1.010 0.894 0.540
% already taking ART pre-intervention 2.582 1.884 0.166
Village in TA Chikowi region 0.400 0.424 0.839
Village distance to health centre 4.489 5.111 0.259
Village distance to Zomba Town 17.490 17.037 0.995
% houses brick‡ 0.450 0.465 0.566
% houses with livestock‡ 0.589 0.615 0.346
% primary school educated‡ 0.289 0.305 0.790
% secondary school educated‡ 0.103 0.100 0.763
% employed‡ 0.207 0.246 0.264
Stratification variables
Indicators for nearest health facility
Village population
Observations 60 59 119
All p-values are for a regression of the covariate on village treatment status, controlling for stratification variables. The
pre-intervention period is 2.5 months. The post-intervention period is 3 months for HIV testing, and 10.5 months for
ART initiation. †Target population: age 15-49, non-pregnant. The target population was calculated from the Malawian
National Statistics Office census at the village level. ‡This measure is based on the selected sample of surveyed meeting
attendees; this selected sample should be the same in treatment and control.
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The average village population is 440, with approximately half be-
tween the ages of 15 and 49. All villages are within 11 kilometers of a
health facility, and the average distance is 5 kilometers.
4.2 Intervention
An information intervention took place in each of the 122 study villages,
in the form of a community health education meeting sanctioned by the
Malawi College of Medicine and the village chief, and conducted by
ten community educators1. The target population consisted of men and
women aged 15 to 49.
Although we use the labels “treatment” and “control” to refer to the
two arms of the experiment, we in fact held information meetings in both
types of villages in order to isolate the treatment effect of one particular
piece of information: the public benefit of ART drugs. In control villages
we provided information on the private benefits of ART drugs, while
in treatment villages we provided information on both the private and
public benefits of ART. In this way, we avoid conflating the effect of beliefs
about the public benefit of ART with the effect of information on the
existence, private benefit, or availability of ART drugs.
In control villages, community educators started the meeting by elic-
iting a rough measure of initial beliefs: a show of hands to determine
whether meeting attendees were aware of the private benefits of ART. 75%
of attendees believed that ART allowed HIV-positive individuals to lead
a long and healthy life. Educators then informed meeting attendees that
ART increases life expectancy, hides the symptoms of AIDS, and is free at
local clinics. They emphasized the importance of correct adherence, and
that condom use and abstinence were good methods of HIV prevention.
They did not discuss the link between ART use and HIV transmission.
Educators used an infographic depicting a reduction in viral load to
explain how ART alleviates the symptoms of AIDS (Figure 4.2).
In treatment villages, community educators provided information on
both the private and public benefits of ART drugs. First, they provided
the same basic information they provided in control villages. Next, they
elicited a measure of initial beliefs about the public benefit of ART: a show
1These meetings took place in November and December, 2013. The educators had
official identification badges from the Malawi College of Medicine which were meant to
increase their credibility.
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of hands indicated that the public benefit of ART was initially unknown
to most community members; on average, only 5% of meeting attendees
believed that ART drugs had any effect at all on HIV transmission. Ed-
ucators then explained the magnitude of the public benefit: that ART
reduces the probability of HIV transmission by 96%. They also used
an infographic depicting not only the fact that ART reduces a person’s
viral load, but that this reduction in viral load leads to a reduction in
transmission risk (Figure 4.3). The community educators emphasized
that this reduction in HIV risk was based on correct adherence to ART as
prescribed.
Figure 4.2: Infographic used during intervention: control
HIV NEGATIVE HIV POSITIVE
HIV POSITIVE + ARV
Similar infographics with an HIV-positive woman were also shown at each meeting.
Figure 4.3: Infographic used during intervention: treatment
HIV NEGATIVE HIV POSITIVE
HIV POSITIVE + ARV
96%
Similar infographics with an HIV-positive woman were also shown at each meeting.
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A detailed description of the information provided in treatment and
control villages is shown in Table 4.2. Educators followed a carefully
worded script, and answered questions only by repeating information
already provided. Unanswered questions were referred to the nearest
health facility. The meetings were balanced in terms of length (approxi-
mately 45 minutes) and community participation; treatment and control
villages had different show-of-hands questions and infographics. The
information content of the meetings was identical, except for the crucial
discussion about ART and HIV transmission.
The community educators first conducted meetings in the control vil-
lages, which took place over ten days. At the end of these ten days,
training on the treatment village information campaign took place, and
the meetings in treatment villages took place over the following ten days.
We conducted the control and treatment interventions sequentially in
order to prevent information spillovers due to the conduct of the com-
munity educators. The team of educators traveled together to a different
geographical section of Zomba District on each day, and within that
area they were randomly assigned to different villages. Small villages
were assigned one educator, while in villages with over 100 households
work was done in pairs. Educators disseminated information through
a combination of the meeting organized by the village chief and door-
to-door campaigning. The educators knew they were to receive large
incentives based on knowledge retention in the specific treatment and
control villages they had visited, according to data from a survey five
months after the intervention2. While educators knew the maximum size
and timing of the incentive, the exact relationship between the survey
questions and the size of the incentive were left intentionally undefined
in order to avert any attempt to “teach to the test.”
Attendance levels at community health meetings were high. An av-
erage of 67% of the target population was reached in each village, and
approximately two thirds of attendees were women. It does not appear
as though the community educators learned to attract more meeting at-
tendees over time; the average attendance level was insignificantly lower
in the treatment group (65%) than in the control group (68%). The topic of
2The maximum incentive was approximately 100 USD. These incentives were paid
to community educators in May, 2014, and the size of the incentive was based on the
percent of community meeting attendees in treatment villages who believed that ART
prevents HIV transmisson, and the percent of community meeting attendees in control
villages who believed that ART had private benefits, as recorded in the survey.
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Table 4.2: Intervention
Topic Script Control Treatment
Initial beliefs
about private
benefits of ART
Raise your hand if you believe that a person
with HIV can live a long and healthy life
with ART.
X
Private benefits of
ART
A person who has HIV can live a long,
healthy, normal life, as long as he or she
takes ART properly.
X X
ART mechanism:
reduction in viral
load
If a person with HIV takes ART he will still
have HIV, but he will have a lower viral
load, so the symptoms may disappear.
X X
Infographic
(control)
Figure 4.2 X
Initial beliefs
about public
benefit of ART
Imagine a couple. One person is HIV posi-
tive and the other one is HIV negative. If the
HIV-positive person takes ART, does that
reduce the chance that the virus is passed to
his or her partner? Raise your hand if you
think the answer is yes.
X
Public benefit of
ART
Actually, it is true that if a person with HIV
takes ART, it can greatly reduce the chance
of spreading HIV. Imagine a certain area
where no one takes ART. In that area, 100
people got HIV from their partners last year.
If those partners had been taking ART, only
4 people would have gotten HIV. 96 of them
would have remained HIV negative.
If a person with HIV takes ART he will be-
come 96% less contagious. This is true for
both men and women. This is because ART
reduces the amount of virus in the body.
When there is very little virus in the body,
it is much less likely that the virus will be
transmitted from one person to another.
X
Infographic
(treatment)
Figure 4.3 X
Other information
about ART
Only HIV-positive people should take ART.
The person who is taking ART must adhere
properly, taking the pills every day, exactly
as instructed. If he or she forgets to take the
pills, the viral load will go back up.
X X
Other HIV
prevention
methods
For maximum protection from HIV, you
should be faithful to one partner and use
condoms.
X X
Availability of
ART
Health clinics offer free HIV testing and
ART.
X X
Questions For other questions, ask at the health clinic. X X
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the meeting was not announced ahead of time, so the sample of meeting
attendees should be similar in treatment and control villages. Village
chiefs received small gifts of soap and salt for organizing and advertising
the meetings, but attendees did not receive any incentive for attendance.
4.3 Empirical Estimation
As a first step, we ascertain whether the information campaign achieved
its goal of shifting beliefs about the public benefit of ART, and whether
other types of beliefs were affected. We also investigate the effect of the
intervention on survey measures of stigma.
4.3.1 Survey data
We conducted a survey approximately five months after the intervention.
A total of 1,357 individuals were interviewed. The purpose of this survey
was to collect individual data on beliefs, attitudes towards HIV, health
seeking behavior, and sexual behavior. The survey also provided data on
village-level covariates which were not available from census data, such
as wealth and education.
The interviewers selected respondents by conducting a random walk
within each village3. The survey was administered only to those who
attended the community health meeting4.
The interviewers were hired from a pool of candidates who were not
socially connected to the community educators employed for the inter-
vention. Interviewers had no information on the purpose of the original
intervention, nor the identities of the treatment and control villages. Out
of 122 study villages, 119 were successfully surveyed. In one treatment
village and two control villages, village authorities denied permission for
a survey to take place due to the recent death of a village leader.
3Two interviewers were assigned to each village; one began the random walk at the
center and the other at an outer edge of the village.
4This results in selection bias among those interviewed relative to a random sample
of the village as a whole, but this selection should be the same in both treatment and
control villages.
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4.3.2 Regression equation
In order to investigate the effect of the information treatment on the
beliefs of meeting attendees, we regress each belief measure captured in
the survey on the treatment status of the village. Because the information
treatment was randomly assigned, this allows us to estimate the causal
effect of the information treatment on beliefs.
Belie fij = α+ βTj + δTχij + eij (4.1)
Here, Belie fij is a belief measure elicited from respondent i in vil-
lage j and Tj ∈ {0, 1} is the treatment status of village j. χij is a set
of individual- and village-level covariates5. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the village level. Because Tj is randomly assigned, we expect
E(eij|Tj) = 0, so the OLS estimate βˆ is unbiased.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Beliefs about the Public Benefit of ART
Eliciting beliefs about the public benefit of ART was a primary goal of the
survey, conducted approximately five months after the intervention. Five
different measures were collected. We also elicited two of these measures
for a subset of community members who did not attend the meeting, in
order to gauge the spread of information. Finally, because the information
we provided is somewhat complicated and may require a certain level of
numeracy to properly explain or understand, we look at heterogeneous
effects by respondent’s education and community educator’s education
level.
In our first survey measure, respondents were presented with a list of
possible HIV prevention methods, including the use of condoms, mosquito
nets, circumcision, abstinence, and ART. They were asked to select those
which reduce the probability of transmitting HIV. Most respondents in
the treatment group and only 19% in the control group chose ART as a
prevention method (see Column 1 of Table 4.3).
5Individual-level controls include age, gender, whether the person is pregnant,
married, has regular partner, employed, primary school educated, secondary school
educated, has livestock, and has a brick house. Village-level controls consist of covariates
listed in Table 4.1 and community educator fixed effects.
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Next, respondents were asked to agree or disagree (on a Likert five-
point scale) with the following statment: ART reduces the probability that an
HIV-positive person will spread the virus to his or her partner. The information
treatment had a significant effect; the average response in the control
group was “disagree”, while in the treatment group the average response
was “agree” (this measure is in Column 2 of Table 4.3, rescaled).
Respondents then ranked the following two types of potential sexual
partners according to HIV transmission risk: a person who has never
been tested for HIV, and a person who is HIV positive and taking ART
correctly. Column 3 of Table 4.3 shows that in the control group, re-
spondents said, on average, that a person who has never been tested
for HIV is less risky, while in the treatment group, most said that a
person taking ART is a safer sexual partner. This suggests that many who
attended the community meeting understood an important implication of
the information provided: that a partner who has never been tested might
in fact be more risky than a partner who is infected but treated.
In order to elicit beliefs about the rate of HIV transmission with and
without ART drugs, we took inspiration from the bean-counting subjec-
tive beliefs measure advocated by Delevande and Kohler (2009). Respon-
dents were shown ten bottle caps. Each bottlecap was meant to represent
a serodiscordant couple: an HIV-positive person and his or her HIV-
negative spouse. Respondents removed one bottle cap for each person
who they believed would contract HIV within one year, assuming no one
was taking ART. The process was then repeated, under the alternative as-
sumption that all HIV-positive individuals took ART drugs as prescribed.
Using these two measures of absolute and relative transmission rates, we
calculate the beliefs about the relative reduction in risk associated with
ART use. In Column 4 of Table 4.3, we see that based on this measure,
individuals in the treatment group believe that the relative reduction in
HIV transmission risk is approximately 53%; this is much higher than in
the control group (9%) but still well below the true value ρ = 0.96.
We also capture beliefs about the ART prevention parameter ρ using
an infographic similar to the one displayed at the community health
meetings (Figure 4.4). This measure was elicited last to ensure that re-
spondents were not visually reminded of the information campaign be-
fore discussing their beliefs. Histograms in Figure 4.5 show that the
distribution of beliefs about ρ is uniformly higher in the treatment group.
In Column 5 of Table 4.3, we see that average beliefs ρˆ are significantly
higher in the treatment group, but below the true value ρ = 0.96. It is
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reassuring that the measures in Columns 4 and 5 are somewhat similar.
Figure 4.4: Infographic used to elicit beliefs
Respondents were asked to state their beliefs about the relative rate of HIV transmission
for a person taking ART drugs by selecting one of eight options. The top left corresponds
to the belief that an infected person taking ART drugs is not at all contagious. The
bottom right corresponds to the belief that an infected person taking ART drugs and an
infected person not taking ART drugs are equally contagious.
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Figure 4.5: Beliefs ρˆ (ART prevention parameter)
(a) Control
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(b) Treatment
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Beliefs were elicited using the infographic in Figure 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Survey Measures of Beliefs about ρ: Does ART reduce HIV transmission?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Selected ART
from list of HIV
prevention
methods
Likert scale
(rescaled 0-1)
Partner
taking
ART is
less risky
Relative
reduction:
ρˆ
Infographic:
ρˆ
non-
attendees
non-
attendees
T 0.645*** 0.020 0.371*** 0.111** 0.261*** 0.439*** 0.472***
(0.059) (0.015) (0.035) (0.044) (0.068) (0.050) (0.052)
(T)*(primary school educ.) 0.015 0.048* -0.029 0.077* 0.053
(0.044) (0.028) (0.070) (0.042) (0.036)
(T)*(educator educ.) -0.116* -0.043 0.078 -0.041 -0.006
(0.069) (0.043) (0.083) (0.057) (0.065)
Educator educ. 0.072 0.022 -0.061 0.044 0.053
(0.054) (0.030) (0.059) (0.035) (0.047)
Mean of dep var in control 0.19 0.01 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.09 0.18
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Individuals) 1343 536 1340 510 1341 1310 1340
Survey to meeting attendees ((1b) and (2b) to non-attendees) in all villages. ρ = 0.96 the relative reduction in HIV transmission with
ART drugs. (1) Selected ART as method of preventing HIV from list. (2) Likert-scale measure, rescaled to (0,1): Do you agree or disagree?
If a person who is HIV positive takes ART it will reduce the chance that he transmits HIV to his or her partner. (3) Used ten bottle caps to show
beliefs about absolute transmission probability with/without ART. These were used to calculate relative reduction in risk. (4) Believes
that a person on ART drugs is less likely to transmit HIV than a person who has never been tested. (5) Selection from Table 4.4,
rescaled into a measure of ρ. T = respondent’s village is in treatment group. The post-intervention period is approximately 5 months.
All regressions are OLS, at the individual level, with individual-level controls, village-level controls and a constant. Individual-level
controls: age, gender, pregnant, married, has regular partner, employed, primary school educated, secondary school educated, has
livestock, has a brick house. Village-level controls: Table 4.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and given in the
parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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4.4.2 The Role of Education
The ability to understand relative rates of HIV transmission with and
without ART drugs might depend on numeracy skills. For this reason,
in order to benefit from the information campaign, one might require
an education. Surprisingly, Table 4.3 shows that while two of the five
belief measures seem to show that more educated respondents better
understood the information campaign, the effect of the intervention is
still large and highly significant for uneducated respondents (those who
had not completed primary school).
We also investigate the effect of the community educator’s education.
Five community educators had completed only secondary school, while
the other five had completed some type of post-secondary degree or
diploma. Table 4.3 shows that both types of educators were equally able
to transmit the intended information. This is useful from a policy point
of view, as in Malawi and many other sub-Saharan African countries, a
secondary education is relatively common while post-secondary is not.
4.4.3 The Spread of Information
There are reasons to believe that, while the information provided at the
community health meetings was useful and important, it may not have
been shared with non-attendees. Speaking about HIV may be viewed as
a signal of infection, and a person who claims that a treated, infected
partner is not contagious may be disbelieved and viewed with suspicion.
While the goal of the survey was primarily to interview those who
attended community meetings, we also conducted short interviews of
536 non-attendees in an effort to gauge the spread of information within
each village. We asked only two questions, corresponding to the first
two measures of beliefs about the public benefit of ART. As shown in
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.3, while information may have spread to
some community members who did not attend a meeting, the effect of
the campaign on non-attendees was small.
4.4.4 Beliefs about the Private Benefits of ART
Both treatment and control villages received basic information about the
private benefits of ART drugs, and indeed, Column 1 of Table 4.4 shows
that respondents’ beliefs do not differ between the treatment and control
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groups. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a five-point
Likert scale, with the statement An HIV-positive person can live a long and
healthy life if he takes ART. This statement closely matches the intervention
script. In both treatment and control villages, the average respondent
strongly agreed with the statement.
4.4.5 Beliefs about HIV Transmission and Prevalence
The information campaign could have affected several beliefs about HIV.
The knowledge that ART reduces HIV transmission may cause individ-
uals to update their beliefs about the overall HIV prevalence in their
community. In addition, while the absolute transmission rate was not
mentioned during the information campaign, attendees may have formed
some correct or incorrect beliefs about this rate based on the information
that was provided. However, Table 4.4 shows that there were no signifi-
cant changes in these beliefs.
As mentioned above, we elicited beliefs about the absolute transmis-
sion rate using ten bottle caps. We asked respondents how many HIV-
negative individuals with infected, untreated partners would contract the
virus over the course of one year. The respondent removed one bottle
cap for each case of HIV transmission. We also used bottle caps to mea-
sure beliefs about prevalence. Ten bottle caps represented ten randomly
selected members of the community, and the respondent was to remove
one bottle cap for each member who was HIV positive.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.4 show that neither beliefs about the ab-
solute transmission rate, nor beliefs about HIV prevalence were affected
by the information campaign. We might expect beliefs about prevalence
to be lower in the treatment group, as respondents are aware that ART
should slow the spread of HIV in the population. While this coefficient
is negative, it is small and insignificant. This may be explained by fact
that ART has only been available for the past few years, and adoption
has been low, so a reasonable update in beliefs about the spread of HIV
might be quite small.
Beliefs about HIV transmission and prevalence are incorrect in both
treatment and control villages. In particular, beliefs about the absolute
probability of HIV transmission are much higher than the true value,
which, according to the Malawi National AIDS Commission, is approxi-
mately 10% per year. These beliefs are consistent with the overestimates
of HIV transmission rates measured by Kerwin (2012) in Malawi, and may
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Table 4.4: Survey Measures of Other Beliefs about HIV
(1) (2) (3)
ART leads
to a long
and
healthy
life: Likert
scale
(rescaled
0-1)
Absolute
transmis-
sion
probability
(one year)
HIV
prevalence
in
community
T 0.007 -0.009 0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Mean of dep var in control 0.95 0.96 0.54
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Individuals) 1340 1330 1224
Survey to meeting attendees in both treatment and control villages. (1) A Likert-scale
measure, rescaled to (0,1): Agree or disagree with the following statement: an HIV-positive
person can live a long and healthy life if he or she takes ART properly.. (2) The respondent
used ten bottle caps to show their beliefs about the one-year probability of HIV trans-
mission for a serodiscordant couple who are not using condoms or taking ART. (3)
The respondent used ten bottle caps to show their beliefs about the HIV prevalence
in the village. T = respondent’s village is in treatment group. The post-intervention
period is approximately 5 months. All regressions are OLS, at the individual level,
with individual-level controls, village-level controls and a constant. Individual-level
controls: age, gender, pregnant, married, has regular partner, employed, primary school
educated, secondary school educated, has livestock, has a brick house. Village-level
controls: Table 4.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and given in
the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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be explained by a health education policy which purposely overstates the
risk of contracting HIV in an effort to discourage risk taking behavior.
Chapter 5
Stigma as Statistical
Discrimination
In this chapter, we present evidence for a particular mechanism through
which HIV may be stigmatized: the rational fear of HIV transmission
between sexual partners. This type of stigma, when combined with a sig-
nalling model of HIV testing, provides an economic microfoundation for
social stigma in the context of HIV testing and treatment. We undertake
a clean empirical test of the underlying mechanism, making use of the
information experiment described in Section 4.2.
In the model, a person seeks an HIV test only if he is likely to be HIV
positive, and thus benefit from access to antiretroviral therapy (ART).
This leads to adverse selection among those seen to seek an HIV test:
they are more likely than the average person to be HIV positive. Society
will view HIV testing as a signal of transmission risk, and some fraction
of the population will reject potential partners seen or known to have
been tested for HIV. This strategy in turn discourages members of the
community from getting tested, as they realize they will face a penalty in
their personal lives.
This signalling equilibrium is based on a misconception: in fact, a
person who has been tested and treated for HIV is a relatively low-risk
sexual partner, because of the capacity for ART drugs to greatly reduce
HIV transmission (Cohen et al., 2011). For this reason, the information
intervention discussed in Chapter 4 is a useful test of this theory of
stigma. By investigating the effect of the intervention on health seeking
behavior, we will present evidence for fear of contagion as a source of
stigma, and show that it is a significant barrier to HIV testing.
52
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5.1 Theory
We define HIV-related stigma as a phenomenon whereby individuals who
are suspected of having HIV are excluded from social interactions1. This
chapter focuses on one potential source of stigma, and one particular type
of social interaction. Individuals who are likely to be HIV positive may be
excluded from sexual interactions due to a rational fear of contagion. If
HIV testing is a signal of underlying risk, that is, high-risk individuals
are more likely to seek an HIV test, then those who do so may face
statistical discrimination by potential sexual partners. Other types of
stigma, and other barriers to HIV testing2 may exist, and are included
in the model in reduced form3. Comparative statics will show that the
information experiment reduces stigma if and only if it is due to a fear
of HIV transmission; other forms of stigma and costs of testing remain
unaffected.
5.1.1 Environment
We model the HIV testing decision as a one-sided signalling game be-
tween two players, over two periods. In the first period, the first player
decides whether to seek an HIV test based on his private type, which
corresponds to his HIV risk. In the second period, he is matched at
random to a potential sexual partner, who might observe whether or not
he has been tested for HIV. Based on this signal, the second player decides
whether or not to consent to a sexual relationship.
Consider a continuum of agents A = [0, 1], and another continuum of
equal measure B = [0, 1] which represents potential sexual partners for
agents in A. A fraction h¯ of individuals a ∈ A are HIV positive, while
every b ∈ B is HIV negative4. We denote HIV status by ha ∈ {0, 1}.
1This is derived from the seminal definition by Goffman (1963), who defines stigma
as “The phenomenon whereby an individual with an attribute which is deeply discred-
ited by his/her society is rejected as a result of the attribute.”
2HIV testing has increased significantly over the past decade, in part due to in-
creased supply of HIV testing services and ART. We do not wish to suggest that stigma
is the only potential barrier to HIV testing.
3For ease of exposition, we include only stigma from potential sexual partners. Al-
lowing for stigma from the general population does not produce a substantially different
model or predictions.
4We shall refer to a as “he” and b as “she” for clarity, but the model is not meant to
be gender specific.
CHAPTER 5. STIGMA AS STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 54
We assume that individuals possess asymmetric information about
their own HIV risk, as they have full knowledge of past risk-taking be-
havior and current symptoms. In the first period, each agent a ∈ A
privately observes his type θa. This represents his probability of being
infected, which takes one of two values:
θa ∈ {θL, θH}
with 0 < θL < θH < 1. We refer to these two types as low-risk and
high-risk types, respectively.
The agent a then decides whether or not to seek an HIV test, and if so,
whether to test at a far away clinic tFa ∈ {0, 1} or nearby tNa ∈ {0, 1}, such
that tNa + tFa ∈ {0, 1} (agents cannot test in both locations). HIV testing
is beneficial to those who are infected, as it provides immediate access to
ART drugs5. ART drugs yield total payoff v every period if the test result
is positive, and 0 otherwise.
The cost of traveling to a nearby clinic is c, while traveling to a far away
clinic costs c + d. These costs are not necessarily monetary: they include
the opportunity cost of time, the probability that the clinic is closed, and
the psychic cost of learning one’s HIV status.
We assume that for low-risk types, the direct cost of HIV testing is
higher than the expected benefit of access to medication, as the test result
is unlikely to be positive. Meanwhile, for high-risk types, the expected
benefit is higher than the direct cost.
θLv(1+ δ) < c < θHv(1+ δ) (5.1)
Here δ denotes the discount factor between periods 1 and 2. We also
assume that the cost of traveling to a far away clinic is bounded in the
following way6.
d
1− φ < θHv(1+ δ)− c (5.2)
Agents a ∈ A receive the following payoff at the end of the first period.
ua1(n, f ) = (t
N
a + t
F
a )(hav− c)− tFa d (5.3)
In the second period, each agent a ∈ A is matched at random with a
5In this model, if we allowed those who tested positive to forgo ART, a person who
knows he would do so would has no motivation to test in the first place.
6If this does not hold, then no equilibrium will exist in which agents test far away.
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potential sexual partner b ∈ B. While b is aware of the population HIV
prevalence h¯, she does not observe a’s risk type directly, and she does not
observe whether or not he is HIV positive.
Agent b may, however observe a’s testing decision. If a tested nearby,
he is observed with probability one, while if he tested far away, he is
observed with probability φ ∈ (0, 1). This is modeled by a signal σa ∈
{0, 1} with P(σa = 1) = tNa + φtFa . Agent b uses this signal to form beliefs
about the probability that her partner a is HIV positive; we denote these
beliefs by θˆb(σa).
Agent b then decides whether to consent to a sexual relationship with
her match, mb ∈ {0, 1}. If b consents, a and b obtain relationship benefits
ya ∼ G and yb ∼ G respectively7, where the distribution G has positive
support.
Consenting to the relationship comes with a cost to agent b; she risks
becoming infected with HIV. Because ART drugs reduce HIV transmis-
sion, the probability of contracting HIV from an infected partner depends
on whether or not he has been tested and treated. The relative reduction
in HIV transmission risk associated with ART use is denoted by ρ, and
the true value is approximately 0.96 (Cohen et al., 2011). We denote the
absolute transmission rate by τ; this is the probability that an infected
person transmits HIV to his sexual partner if he is not taking ART. The
cost of contracting HIV is s.
We also allow for other forms of stigma. Agent b may experience
disutility from a relationship with an HIV-positive person distinct from
the possibility of contracting HIV. This could be, for example, because of
a’s propensity for infidelity, because of social norms, or because of a taste
parameter. We capture all of these costs in reduced form, denoted by s0.
If b chooses to consent, the second-period payoff to agent a consists
of the benefit of the relationship and, in the case where he has tested
positive for HIV, the value of ART drugs .
ua2(mb) = mbya + (t
N
a + t
F
a )(hav) (5.4)
The second-period payoff to agent b depends on both the benefit of the
relationship and the risk of contracting HIV.
ub2(mb) = mb
[
yb − ha
(
sτ
(
1− ρ(tNa + tFa )
)
+ s0
)]
(5.5)
7We have assumed that a always obtains net benefit from the relationship. We do
not model his consent decision.
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In calculating the payoff to agent b we make use of our assumption that
everyone who seeks an HIV test receives ART immediately. This allows
agent b to conclude that an HIV-positive individual who has been tested
is less contagious, as captured by the term (1− ρ(tNa + tFa )).
We now make two additional assumptions. First,
P(yb > h¯(sτ + s0)) = 1; (5.6)
the net payoff from a sexual relationship with the average, untreated
member of the population is always positive. Second,
P(yb < sτ + s0) = 1; (5.7)
the net payoff from a sexual relationship with an untreated, HIV-positive
match is always negative.
Heterogeneous beliefs about the effect of ART
In order to illustrate the link between the model of stigma and the exper-
iment we use to test it, we assume that agents differ in their perception of
the risk of HIV transmission. Specifically, agents in B have heterogeneous
beliefs about the extent to which ART drugs prevent the spread of HIV.
Each agent b ∈ B has belief ρˆb ∈ [0, 1] about the relative reduction in HIV
transmission risk associated with ART. For example, ρˆ = 0 corresponds
to the belief that ART has no effect on transmission, and ρˆ = 1 to the
belief that it is impossible to contract HIV from a person taking ART.
We denote by Fρˆ the distribution of beliefs8 in the population B. We
assume that Fρˆ is common knowledge among the population A. This
distribution of beliefs forms a key link between the model and our exper-
imental design: our intervention provides information on the true value
of ρ, which leads to a shift9 in the distribution Fρˆ.
5.1.2 Strategies and Equilibria
We solve for the pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game.
8We do not assume any relationship between the distribution of beliefs and the true
value ρ = 0.96. Indeed, Figure 4.5 illustrates the extent to which beliefs are incorrect.
9The distribution of beliefs, as well as the effect of the intervention are illustrated in
Figure 4.5.
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In the first period, agents in A choose an HIV-testing strategy {tN, tF}
to maximize their present discounted expected utility
E(ua1 + δu
a
2),
taking their private types, the strategies of {b ∈ B}, as well as beliefs Fρˆ
and {θˆb(σ) : b ∈ B} as given.
In the second period, agents b ∈ B receive the signal σa and form
corresponding beliefs about a’s type θˆb(σa), which are consistent on the
equilibrium path. That is, agents use Bayes’ rule to calculate the proba-
bility that a person is infected, taking into account whether or not they
were observed seeking an HIV test. They then choose whether or not to
consent in order to maximize their expected utility, based on their beliefs
ρˆb and θˆb.
Proposition 1. There are two classes of pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equi-
libria in this game. The first is a “stigma” equilibrium, in which a fraction S
of agents in B reject a match who has been observed seeking an HIV test, and
the remaining fraction 1− S of agents consent to any match. The second is a
“reverse stigma” equilibrium, in which a fraction P of agents in B consent if and
only if their match has been observed seeking an HIV test.
We restrict attention to the “stigma” equilibrium, as the “reverse stigma”
equilibrium implies universal testing, which is not consistent with the low
testing levels observed in the data. Discussion of this second equilibrium,
as well as the proof that no other equilibria exist is deferred to Appendix
5.A.
The stigma equilibrium
We begin by characterizing the most important equilibrium for our pur-
poses, in which there is stigma against HIV testing. In this equilibrium,
every b ∈ B consents to a match who has not been observed testing, but
a proportion S of {b ∈ B} reject those who have been observed seeking
an HIV test.
Given this strategy by agents in population B, the decision to test for
HIV is based on the expected impact on present discounted utility, which
is equal to
θav(1+ δ)− c− δSya
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if the test is sought at a nearby clinic, and
θav(1+ δ)− c− d− φδSya
if the test is sought at a far away clinic. In both cases, there is an indirect
cost of testing due to the stigma agent a might face in the next period,
and this cost is higher if a chooses to test nearby.
By assumption (5.1), low-risk types will never seek an HIV test in this
equilibrium. If θa = θH, a will select an action as follows.
(tNa , t
F
a ) =

(0, 0) if θHv(1+δ)−c−dφδS < ya
(0, 1) if d
(1−φ)δS < ya ≤ θHv(1+δ)−c−dφδS
(1, 0) if ya ≤ d(1−φ)δS < θHv(1+δ)−c−dφδS
In the absence of stigma, all high-risk types would like to seek an HIV test
nearby. However, if S > 0, high-risk types will choose to not test, test far
away, or test nearby depending on their benefit from a future relationship,
ya. Those who value a future sexual relationship very highly will not seek
an HIV test. Agents with intermediate values if ya will choose far away
testing, and those who value the relationship least will test nearby, as
they have less to lose by being observed. In any case, the fact that only
high-risk types seek HIV testing results in adverse selection.
We now turn our attention to the consent decision. If an agent b does
not observe her match seeking an HIV test (σa = 0), she will consent to a
sexual relationship. This stems from assumption (5.6), which states that
any agent b ∈ B would obtain net benefit from a relationship with the
average member of the population A. Because low-risk types do not test
for HIV, they generate the signal σ = 0; meanwhile, some high-risk types
generate σ = 0 and others generate σ = 1. Therefore, the person b has
been matched with cannot be more likely to have HIV than the average
member of the population. Formally, maximizing her expected payoff
(5.5), b will consent if
yb > E
[
ha
(
sτ
(
1− ρˆb(tNa + tFa )
)
+ s0
)
|σa = 0
]
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where we have replaced ρ by the belief ρˆb. The right-hand side of this
inequality is always10 less than or equal to h¯(sτ + s0), so by assumption
(5.6), b will consent.
If, on the other hand, b observes that a has tested for HIV (σa = 1), she
infers that he is a high-risk type. She will therefore consent if11
yb ≥ θH (sτ(1− ρˆb) + s0) . (5.8)
Note that she will only consent if her benefit from the relationship (yb) is
sufficiently high, or if she believes that ART is effective at preventing HIV
transmission (ρˆb is high).
We are now able to provide a formula for the total level of stigma in
the population, S, which we previously defined as the fraction of agents in
B who would withhold consent from a match they have observed seeking
an HIV test.
S =
∫ ∞
0
(∫ 1+(s0/sτ)−(y/θHsτ)
0
f (ρˆ)dρˆ
)
g(y)dy (5.9)
The functions f and g represent probability densities for ρˆ and y respec-
tively.
5.1.3 Comparative Statics
The previous chapter evaluates an experiment that was designed to shift
beliefs about the ART prevention parameter ρ, by disseminating the in-
formation that ART reduces HIV transmission by 96%. In our model, we
interpret this as a first-order stochastically dominant shift in the distribu-
tion Fρˆ. Indeed, we observe empirically that beliefs are biased towards 0
(most are unaware of the preventative effect of ART), and the information
intervention appears to have shifted the distribution uniformly towards 1
(see Figure 4.5).
We now characterize the theoretical implications of such a shift in the
distribution of beliefs.
10Proof: E
(
ha
(
sτ(1− ρˆb(tNa + tFa )
)
+ s0
) |σa = 0) ≤ E(ha(sτ + s0)|σa = 0) =
E(θa|σa = 0)(sτ + s0) ≤ E(θa)(sτ + s0) = h¯(sτ + s0)
11Here, we make use of the fact that she is certain her match is a high-risk type, and
has been tested for HIV: tNa + tFa = 1. In this case, E[ha
(
sτ
(
1− ρˆb(tNa + tFa )
)
+ s0
) |σa =
1] = θH (sτ(1− ρˆb) + s0).
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Proposition 2. If s = 0, a change in the distribution of beliefs Fρˆ has no effect
on the level of stigma S.
This comes from (5.8): if s = 0, a change in ρˆb has no effect on whether
b consents or not. Intuitively, if stigma is based on something other
than the risk of HIV transmission, then changing beliefs about the risk
of transmission will not affect stigma.
In what follows, we consider the case s > 0, that is, there is some cost
associated with contracting HIV.
Proposition 3. If s > 0, a first-order stochastically dominant shift in the
distribution of beliefs Fρˆ results in a weak decrease in the level of stigma S.
If the distribution of beliefs shifts upward, each agent is more likely
to believe that ART is effective in reducing HIV transmission. For some
of these agents, this will imply a change in strategy from not consenting
to consenting. In aggregate, stigma will decrease. Formally, the level of
stigma can be written as
S =
∫ ∞
0
Fρˆ
(
1+
s0
sτ
− y
θHsτ
)
g(y)dy. (5.10)
Consider a first-order stochastically dominant shift in the distribution
Fρˆ. For each value of y, the integrand will decrease. Therefore, S will also
decrease. It is worth pointing out that if other forms of stigma s0 are large
relative to the cost of contracting HIV, s, a shift in beliefs about ρ will have
no effect, as the integrand in (5.10) will equal 1 for any distribution.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that, by shifting beliefs, the direct effect
of the information experiment is to reduce the level of stigma in the
community, if that stigma is based on a fear of contracting HIV. We next
discuss the implications of this reduction in stigma on HIV testing.
Proposition 4. A decrease in stigma leads to an increase in the total number of
HIV tests, and an increase in the number of tests at nearby clinics.
These two statements follow from the fact that a cumulative distribu-
tion function G(y) always increases in y, and limy→∞ G(y) = 1.
Proposition 5. A moderate decrease in stigma has an ambiguous effect on the
number of HIV tests at far away clinics, but as S → 0, the number of far away
tests approaches zero.
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The fraction of {a ∈ A} who choose far away testing equals
G
(
θHv(1+ δ)− c− d
φδS
)
− G
(
d
(1− φ)δS
)
which, depending on the distribution G, may be locally increasing or
decreasing in S.
Figure 5.1 depicts the relationship between stigma, testing levels, and
testing location in the case where the distribution G is normally dis-
tributed and initial testing levels are low. In this case, a moderate increase
in beliefs results in an increase in far away testing, but as stated in Propo-
sition 5, this is not a general result. The effect depends on the distribution
G and on initial testing levels.
Finally, it is important to note that the predicted change in HIV testing
behavior comes from a decrease in stigma, which is driven entirely by
the beliefs of potential sexual partners. This leads to a specific empirical
implication: that the decision to test for HIV should depend on the beliefs
of the community, and not on one’s own beliefs about the preventative
nature of ART drugs.
5.2 Empirical Evidence
In order to test the theoretical predictions of our model, we turn again to
the experiment discussed in Chapter 4. The experiment consisted of an
information intervention which shifted the distribution of beliefs about
the public benefit of ART, Fρˆ. We investigate the effect of this shift on
stigma and health seeking behavior, including HIV testing, the choice of
testing clinic, and the relationship between perceived community beliefs
and the decision to test for HIV.
5.2.1 Data
We make use of two datasets. First, in order to investigate the effect of the
information intervention on stigma, we turn to the survey conducted five
months after the intervention, which was described in detail in Section
4.3.1. Second, we use administrative data to measure health seeking
behavior.
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Figure 5.1: Testing and location depend on stigma
g(y)
near far
yθHv(1+δ)−c−d
φS
d
(1−φ)SHIV testing
(a) High stigma
y
(b) Moderate stigma
y
(c) Low stigma
y
This figure illustrates the proportion of agents a ∈ A who seek nearby and far away
testing, respectively. The curve g(y) is the probability density function for the benefit
of a relationship, ya. To the left of the first threshold, agents seek a nearby HIV test.
Between the first and second thresholds, agents seek a far away test. To the right of the
second threshold no HIV test is sought. These thresholds shift up as stigma S decreases;
a lower level of stigma implies a higher total number of tests and a higher number
of nearby tests. The effect of a shift in stigma on the number of far away tests is in
general ambiguous; in this example far away testing first increases and then decreases.
As S→ 0, the number of far away tests decreases to 0.
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Administrative data
We use administrative data from the handwritten12 patient registers of
18 health facilities in Zomba District, including all free clinics whose
catchment areas include study villages, and all free clinics and hospitals
in Zomba Town.
We photographed and digitized HIV testing registers and outpatient
department registers, concealing identifying information due to ethical
concerns about privacy. Data on ART use was digitized and provided by
Dignitas International, a health care NGO, as a part of their monitoring
and evaluation activity.
We collected HIV testing data for the period covering 2.5 months
before the start of the intervention and 3 months after the intervention
ended. HIV testing registers at each health facility include fields for the
date, gender, age, and address or home village (see Figure 5.2). This last
field allows us to link the HIV test to the patient’s village, and in partic-
ular, to determine whether that village belongs to the study’s treatment
group or control group. HIV testing registers also indicate whether the
patient was pregnant, whether or not the test was a joint test, the time
since the client’s last HIV test, and the result of the test. The distance
traveled to the facility is calculated from GPS coordinates of the clinics
and the study villages, as recorded in census data13.
12There are two exceptions: Zomba Central Hospital and Matawale Health Facility
both have electronic registers. Health facility data was obtained with the permission of
the Malawi College of Medicine, as well as the Malawi District Health Office and Zomba
Central Hospital
13Census data was obtained from the Malawi National Statistics Office
C
H
A
PTER
5.
STIG
M
A
A
S
STA
TISTIC
A
L
D
ISC
R
IM
IN
A
TIO
N
64
Figure 5.2: HIV testing register
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5.2.2 Survey Measures of Stigma
In the model, stigma is explained by the fact that some people will reject
a potential sexual partner who has been tested for HIV, because such a
partner is more likely to be HIV positive and taking ART drugs. Accord-
ing to the theory, a shift in beliefs about the public benefit of ART ought
to reduce this type of stigma. If the information intervention described in
4 caused such a reduction in stigma, we ought to see a change in attitudes
towards those taking ART drugs.
The survey measures in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.1 directly address
this type of behavior, by asking whether the respondent would reject such
a partner, and also whether others would do so. The first measure asks
respondents whether they would prefer a sexual partner who is taking
ART drugs over one who has never been tested. The second measure
asks whether a person taking ART drugs would be able to find a new
sexual partner. The fact that the information caused a significant change
in both of these measures suggests that the specific mechanism outlined
in our model of stigma may apply.
5.2.3 HIV Testing
The main outcome of interest, both theoretically and from a policy per-
spective, is HIV testing. The experiment shifted community beliefs about
the public benefit of ART drugs (as observed in Chapter 4). As this
reduced stigma, we expect to see a higher number of HIV test seekers
from treatment villages. The HIV testing rate is also important for policy,
especially in the context of this intervention. The information we pro-
vided only addresses the public benefit of ART drugs, so it is likely that
any increase in HIV testing will be followed by increased demand for
ART. Uptake of ART is important because the medication saves lives and
slows the spread of the epidemic.
In the administrative data, we only observe those community mem-
bers who seek an HIV test, so we are required to use a village-level
specification. The primary outcome of interest is the percent of the target
population that seeks an HIV test. We construct this outcome measure
by first aggregating data on individual HIV tests at the village level,
constructing separate variables for tests that took place pre-intervention
and post-intervention14. The target population for the information cam-
14The pre-intervention period covers 2.5 months before the start of the intervention,
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Table 5.1: Survey Measures of Stigma Between Sexual Partners
(1) (2)
=1 if
respondent
prefers
untested
partner to
partner taking
ART
=1 if
respondent
thinks a person
taking ART
won’t find a
new partner
T -0.155*** -0.121***
(0.036) (0.042)
Reference cat 0.46 0.68
Mean of dep var in control 0.46 0.68
Individual controls Yes Yes
Village-level controls Yes Yes
Obs (Individuals) 1224 1276
Survey to meeting attendees in both treatment and control villages. (1) Respondent
would prefer a partner who has never been tested for HIV to one who is taking ART
drugs. (2) Respondent believes that a person taking ART will definitely not find a new
sexual partner. T = respondent’s village is in treatment group. The post-intervention
period is approximately 5 months. All regressions are OLS, at the individual level,
with individual-level controls, village-level controls and a constant. Individual-level
controls: age, gender, pregnant, married, has regular partner, employed, primary school
educated, secondary school educated, has livestock, has a brick house. Village-level
controls: Table 4.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and given in
the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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paign consisted of individuals aged 15 to 49, and we restrict the outcome
variable to include only HIV tests sought by members of this age group.
Pregnant women are excluded, as they undergo mandatory HIV testing
as a part of their antenatal health care. Information from the HIV testing
register determines whether a given patient belongs to the target group,
and census data provides the approximate size of the reference popula-
tion in each village.
In order to identify the causal effect of the information intervention
with high statistical power, we perform an ANCOVA regression at the
village level, controlling for pre-intervention levels of the outcome vari-
able. This estimator is unbiased in a randomized study, and has lower
variance than either a simple regression of post-intervention testing levels
on treatment, or a difference-in-difference estimator (McKenzie, 2012).
As stated above, the dependent variable is the percent of the target
population who sought an HIV test post-intervention. Covariates include
the pre-intervention testing rate, and other village-level covariates de-
termined from the Malawi National Census, GPS coordinates, and the
survey. The full set of village-level and pre-intervention covariates is
listed in Table 4.1. We also control for the community educator assigned
to the village, and stratification variables: the nearest health center and
village population.
This intervention may be subject to spillovers. Indeed, 60% of the
villages in the study are within 1 kilometer of another study village. We
therefore include a specification which controls for both nearby study
villages and nearby treatment villages, considering villages within 1 kilo-
meter (based on GPS coordinates). Because treatment was randomly
assigned, including these regressors together should not introduce en-
dogeneity, and will remove the downward bias caused by spillovers from
treatment villages to control villages. It will, however increase the risk
of multicollinearity. We allow the number of nearby treatment villages to
have a heterogeneous effect based on the treatment status of the village
itself; for example, it may be that control villages are more strongly
impacted by information spillovers than treatment villages, because in
treatment villages the information was provided directly.
and the post-intervention period covers 3 months after the intervention ended. We
ignore all HIV tests that took place during the intervention period, which lasted 22
days.
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Our regression specification is as follows:
Percent HIV testedj = α+ βTj + γTTj ∗NTj + γCCj ∗NTj + γNj + δTχj+ ej.
(5.11)
Tj and Cj are indicators for the treatment group and control group re-
spectively, χp is a vector of village-level covariates including the pre-
intervention testing level (see Table 4.1 for a complete list of village-level
covariates), and community educator fixed effects. NTj is the number of
treatment villages within one kilometre, and Nj is the total number of
study villages within one kilometer. In regressions which do not control
for spillovers, we apply the restriction γT = γC = γ = 0. Standard errors
are robust.
Because Tj is randomly assigned, E(ej|Tj) = 0, and the OLS estimate
βˆ is unbiased.
The information intervention caused a significant increase in the total
number of HIV tests, as shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.2. Con-
trolling for spillovers, the estimated effect size is 60%, measured over a
three-month period. This is higher than the estimate without spillovers
(37%), but also subject to a larger standard error.
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Table 5.2: The Effect of Information about the Public Benefit of ART on
HIV Testing
% of population tested for HIV
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
Average beliefs ρˆ in village 1.224**
(0.540)
T 0.590* 0.956**
(0.323) (0.446)
(C)*(#T villages < 1km) 0.364
(0.461)
(T)*(#T villages < 1km) -0.375
(0.607)
#study villages < 1km -0.148
(0.279)
Weak ID F-stat (KP) 171
Proportional increase in dep var 37% 60% 77%
Mean of dep var in control 1.6 1.6 1.6
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Villages) 119 119 119
Administrative data from 18 health facilities and survey. Dependent variable: % of
village target population tested for HIV post-intervention. (1)-(2): OLS. T = village is in
treatment group. C = village is in control group. (3): 2SLS with T = treatment group as
instrument for beliefs. ρ = the relative reduction in HIV transmission associated with
antiretroviral drugs. True value: ρ = 0.96. Community beliefs about ρ are approximated
by the village-level average of beliefs, as obtained from the survey using the infographic
in Figure 4.4. Target population: age 15-49, non-pregnant. The target population was
calculated from the Malawian National Statistics Office census at the village level. The
post-intervention period is 3 months. All regressions are at the village level, with village-
level controls and include a constant. Village-level controls: Table 4.1 and community
educator fixed effects. Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5.3: The Effect of Information and Beliefs about the Public Benefit of ART on HIV Testing by Gender
% of men tested for HIV % of women tested for HIV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Average beliefs ρˆ in village 1.388** 1.051
(0.609) (0.643)
T 0.669* 0.975* 0.507 0.936*
(0.363) (0.505) (0.383) (0.516)
(C)*(#T villages < 1km) 0.169 0.569
(0.697) (0.488)
(T)*(#T villages < 1km) -0.679 -0.054
(0.656) (0.659)
#study villages < 1km 0.170 -0.482
(0.398) (0.334)
Weak ID F-stat (KP) 171 171
Proportional increase in dep var 50% 72% 103% 27% 50% 56%
Mean of dep var in control 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.86 1.86 1.86
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Villages) 119 119 119 119 119 119
Administrative data from 18 health facilities and survey. Dependent variable: % of village target population tested for HIV post-
intervention. (1)-(2), (4)-(5): OLS. T = village is in treatment group. C = village is in control group. (3),(6): 2SLS with T = treatment
group as instrument for beliefs. ρ = the relative reduction in HIV transmission associated with antiretroviral drugs. True value:
ρ = 0.96. Community beliefs about ρ are approximated by the village-level average of beliefs, as obtained from the survey using
the infographic in Figure 4.4. Target population: age 15-49, non-pregnant. The target population was calculated from the Malawian
National Statistics Office census at the village level. The post-intervention period is 3 months. All regressions are at the village level,
with village-level controls and include a constant. Village-level controls: Table 4.1 and community educator fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Let us turn to the epidemiological literature to put this magnitude of
HIV testing into some context. Granich et al. (2009) provide a mathemati-
cal model for the relationship between HIV testing and the spread of HIV,
taking into account the fact that ART drugs greatly reduce transmission.
The intervention increased annual testing rates among sexually active
individuals from approximately 6.4% to 10.4%, which according their
model should avert at least two new HIV infections per primary infection.
While this is based on a model which abstracts from many behavioral
considerations, it is worth noting that at low levels of HIV testing, a small
increase has the potential to have large epidemiological implications.
The information treatment increased total HIV testing rates signifi-
cantly for both men and women (as shown in Table 5.3). The magnitudes
of the increases are similar, which may at first seem surprising given
the fact that women are, in general, more likely to test than men, and
attendance at community health meetings was higher among women.
However, the model shows that one’s HIV testing decision depends on
the beliefs of one’s potential sexual partners, so the gender split at health
meetings should not necessarily match that of HIV testing clients.
An upward shift in beliefs about the public benefit of ART should
lead to a decrease in stigma, and a subsequent increase in HIV testing
levels. Beliefs about the public benefit of ART drugs were strongly af-
fected by the information campaign, while other beliefs remained largely
unaffected. This makes the information treatment a good candidate for
an instrumental variables approach to estimating the effect of an increase
in community-level beliefs about ρ, the ART prevention parameter. The
village-level average of the measure ρˆ, obtained from the infographic in
Figure 4.4, is an endogenous regressor. Using the information treatment
as an instruments allows us to investigate the effect of community beliefs
on HIV testing.
We estimate a two-stage least squares specification, with first stage
Beliefsj = α0 + β0Tj + δ
T
0 χj + νj (5.12)
and second stage
Percent HIV testedj = α+ β ˆBeliefsj + δ
Tχj + ej. (5.13)
where Beliefsj denotes average beliefs15 about the ART prevention param-
15This is calculated from the survey measure using the infographic in Figure 4.4.
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eter ρ in village j, and ˆBeliefsj denotes its fitted value from the first-stage
regression. χp is a vector of village-level covariates16 and community
educator fixed effects. Standard errors are robust. The identification as-
sumption is E(ej|Tj) = 0. Villages were randomly assigned to treatment
or control, and we assume that the intervention only affected village-level
HIV testing rates through a shift in beliefs about the public benefit of ART,
represented by the parameter ρ. Recall that the only difference between
the community health meetings in treatment and control villages was the
inclusion of information on the public benefit of ART, and Table 4.4 shows
that other beliefs about HIV remained unaffected.
Higher average beliefs about the public benefit of ART lead to a higher
rate of HIV testing. In particular, if an entire community were shifted
from the belief that ART drugs have no effect on HIV transmission, to the
belief that they block transmission completely, the results in Column 3 of
Table 5.2 predict an 77% increase in HIV testing.
5.2.4 HIV Testing Location
Before the intervention, in the average village, 30% of those seeking an
HIV test traveled at least four kilometers further than necessary from
their home villages. This may be indicative of stigma, because traveling
far from home is costly, but reduces the likelihood of being seen by friends
and neighbors.
In general, individuals seeking an HIV test may travel to far away
clinics for reasons other than to avoid being seen, such as differences
in clinic quality or wait time. However, HIV testing is free, and the
procedures are identical at all clinics. Wait times do not vary much,
especially compared with the time spent traveling to the clinic; those who
test far away travel, on average, an extra nine kilometers. Finally, if far
away testing is fully explained by reasons other than stigma, we should
not observe any link between beliefs about the public benefits of ART and
the choice of testing location.
We say that an HIV test takes place far away if it takes place at least
four kilometers further than the client’s nearest health facility17, and in-
vestigate the effect of a shift in beliefs about the public benefit of ART on
testing location. We again run a two-stage least squares regression with
16See Table 4.1 for a complete list of village-level covariates.
17See the Appendix for results using other definitions.
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specifications (5.12) and (5.13). The dependent variable is the number of
total, nearby, or far away HIV tests; Columns 1 to 3 of Table 5.4 show the
results of these three regressions. A shift in beliefs may cause an increase
in nearby testing: the coefficient is large, but imprecisely estimated (Col-
umn 2). The increase in far away testing is significant but small (Column
3).
In order to understand the intervention’s ambiguous effect on testing
location, we turn to the predictions of the model. The model predicts
a specific relationship between the choice of HIV testing location and
the distribution of beliefs about ART in the community, based on the link
between those beliefs and stigma. In particular, a moderate shift in beliefs
about the ART prevention parameter ρ, which corresponds to a moderate
reduction in stigma, could increase both the number of people who test
near their home village and the number who test far away. Meanwhile,
a large shift in beliefs, which corresponds to a large reduction in stigma,
should only increase the number of nearby tests, as people become less
afraid of being seen to seek an HIV test.
We define high beliefs as beliefs18 ρˆ ≥ 0.95, for the simple reason that
this threshold approximately matches the true value of ρ. From a policy
perspective, it is useful to know the effects of shifting beliefs to the true
value of ρ, and whether this is sufficient to cause a reduction in stigma.
As the majority of individuals in control villages hold beliefs ρˆ = 0, we
define moderate beliefs to be 0 < ρˆ < 0.95.
On average, the information intervention shifted beliefs from low be-
liefs ρˆ = 0 to either moderate or high beliefs, as shown in Figure 4.5. The
distribution of beliefs in a given village can be described by three num-
bers: the proportion of the population who hold low beliefs, moderate
beliefs, and high beliefs.
We analyze the following OLS specification.
yj = α+ β1(moderate beliefs)j + β1(high beliefs)j + δ
Tχj + ej (5.14)
yj is set equal to either the percent of the target population in village j
that seeks an HIV test nearby, or the percent of the target population in
village j that seeks an HIV test far away from their home village. The
regressors (moderate beliefs)j and (high beliefs)j represent the proportion of
18These beliefs are elicited in the survey using the infographic in Figure 4.4. Note
that this beliefs measure is discrete, and the selection ρˆ = 0.95 is closest to the true value
of ρ = 0.96.
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the village that has moderate or high beliefs, as estimated from survey
responses. These regressors are not exogenous, and we must interpret
the estimated coefficients βˆ1 and βˆ2 as correlations between the level of
community beliefs and the number of HIV tests either nearby or far away.
χp is a vector of village-level covariates19 and community educator fixed
effects. Standard errors are robust.
19See Table 4.1 for a complete list of village-level covariates.
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Table 5.4: The Effect of the Information Treatment on HIV Testing Location
% tested for HIV (IV) % tested for HIV (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Nearby Far Total Nearby Far
Average beliefs ρˆ in village 1.224** 0.838 0.386*
(0.540) (0.519) (0.204)
Proportion of village believes 0 < ρ < 0.95 0.518 -0.106 0.624**
(0.647) (0.626) (0.295)
Proportion of village believes ρ ≥ 0.95 0.815 1.055* -0.240
(0.698) (0.621) (0.296)
F-stat 171 171 171
Proportional increase in dep var 77% 75% 80%
Mean of dep var in control 1.6 1.11 .48 1.6 1.11 .48
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Villages) 119 119 119 119 119 119
Administrative data from 18 health facilities and survey to meeting attendees in both treatment and control villages. Dependent
variable: % of village target population tested for HIV post-intervention far/nearby. Far clinics defined as >4km further than
nearest free clinic. (1)-(3): 2SLS with T = treatment group as instrument for beliefs. (4)-(6): OLS. ρ = the relative reduction in
HIV transmission associated with antiretroviral drugs. True value: ρ = 0.96. Community beliefs about ρ are approximated by the
village-level average of beliefs, as obtained from the survey using the infographic in Figure 4.4. Omitted reference category: % believe
ρ = 0. Target population: age 15-49, non-pregnant. The target population was calculated from the Malawian National Statistics Office
census at the village level. The post-intervention period is 3 months. All regressions are at the village level, with village-level controls
and include a constant. Village-level controls: Table 4.1 and community educator fixed effects. Robust standard errors are given in
the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Consistent with the predictions of the model, high beliefs about the
public benefit of ART are associated with an increase in the number of
nearby tests, and an (insignificant) decrease in the number of far away
tests, as seen in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.4. This suggests that any
increase in far away testing is driven by a moderate shift in beliefs (Col-
umn 6). In addition, a large shift in beliefs about the public benefit of
ART reduces stigma enough that more people feel comfortable seeking
an HIV test, and are also willing to risk being observed by attending a
clinic near their home village.
5.2.5 HIV Testing and Community Beliefs
The theory predicts that HIV testing decisions should depend on the
level of stigma in the community, which in turn depends on community-
level beliefs about the public benefit of ART. This differs sharply from
predictions based on a model of social preferences, in which one’s own
beliefs matter most, or a model of household bargaining, in which one’s
spouse’s beliefs are important.
In order to test this prediction, we measured perceived beliefs of the
community. That is, as a part of the individual survey we asked respon-
dents what they thought most people in their respective communities
believed about the public benefit of ART. Once a respondent had fully
understood the infographic in Figure 4.4, she was asked which option
that her spouse would choose, and which option most members of the
community would choose.
We regress self-reported HIV testing on this measure of perceived
beliefs. We use the specification
HIV testij = α+ β0(respondent has high beliefs)i + β1(spouse has high beliefs)i+
β2(community has high beliefs)i + δ
Tχij + eij (5.15)
where the dependent variable is an indicator for respondent i in village j
reporting an HIV test post-intervention. The three regressors of interest
are the respondent’s own beliefs, her perception of her spouse’s beliefs,
and her perception of the community’s beliefs. These three variables are
indicators for high beliefs about the public benefit of ART, ρˆ > 0.95.
The set of covariates χij includes individual- and village-level controls20.
20Individual-level controls are age, gender, whether the person is pregnant, married,
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Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
has regular partner, employed, primary school educated, secondary school educated,
has livestock, and has a brick house.. Village-level controls are covariates listed in Table
4.1 and community educator fixed effects.
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Table 5.5: Own Beliefs vs. Perception of Community Beliefs and Self-Reported HIV Testing
HIV Test: post-intervention pre-intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Respondent believes ρ ≥ 0.95 -0.033 0.000 0.007
(0.047) (0.072) (0.061)
Respondent thinks spouse believes ρ ≥ 0.95 -0.084 -0.016
(0.084) (0.069)
Respondent thinks community believes ρ ≥ 0.95 0.083* 0.106** 0.139** -0.058
(0.043) (0.049) (0.055) (0.054)
Mean of dep var in control 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.23
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Individuals) 1333 1330 1079 1079
Survey to meeting attendees in both treatment and control villages. Dependent variable: indicator for whether the respondent
reported having an HIV test. ρ = the relative reduction in HIV transmission associated with antiretroviral drugs. True value:
ρ = 0.96. Beliefs about ρ are obtained from the survey using the infographic in Figure 4.4. (5)-(8): sample restricted to married
respondents. The pre-intervention period is 5 months. The post-intervention period is approximately 5 months. All regressions
are OLS, at the individual level, with individual-level controls, village-level controls and a constant. Individual-level controls: age,
gender, pregnant, married, has regular partner, employed, primary school educated, secondary school educated, has livestock, has a
brick house. Village-level controls: Table 4.1 and community educator fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the village
level and given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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As predicted, Table 5.5 shows that survey respondents are much more
likely to report an HIV test post-intervention if they perceive the com-
munity to have high beliefs about the public benefit of ART drugs. The
respondent’s own beliefs and perceived spouse’s beliefs do not play a
significant role.
5.2.6 Sexual Behavior
A reduction in stigma, as defined in the model, may lead to risk compen-
sation in the context of sexual behavior. We model stigma as the fraction
of the population who would reject a potential sexual partner based on
his decision to seek an HIV test, and we predict that this fraction should
decrease in response to the information intervention. Because HIV testing
increases, the overall effect on the level of sexual activity is ambiguous.
We regress self-reported measures of sexual behavior on village treat-
ment status, following specification (4.1). The dependent variables are
the number of sex acts and number of condoms used, both recalled
by respondents over the past seven days. We estimate the number of
unprotected sex acts (Column 3 of Table 5.6) by subtracting the number
of condoms from the total number of sex acts21.
The number of unprotected sex acts is insignificantly higher in the
treatment group (see Table 5.6). The overall effect comes from an in-
significant increase sexual activity and a small decrease in condom use,
as seen in Columns 1 and 2. These results are in line with previous work
showing limited risk compensation in response to information on HIV
transmission risk (Kerwin, 2014), and in response to the large benefits of
ART drugs (Friedman, 2015).
While the increase in unprotected sex is statistically insignificant, the
magnitude of the coefficient is not negligible. Before reaching the con-
clusion that this is a negative effect of the information campaign, it is
worth noting that rational agents may be expected to increase their sexual
interactions in response to the information. Risk compensation may come
with large benefits including, for example, being able to start a family.
Finally, if we assume that the increase in risk taking was among those
who either tested negative, or are taking ART, the level of risk com-
pensation we observe is inconsequential in terms of HIV transmission22
21In the case where more condoms were used than sex acts performed, we set the
number of unprotected sex acts equal to zero.
22Risk compensation may be of concern for other reasons, for example, the spread
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Table 5.6: Risk Compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Sex acts Condoms
used
Unprotected
sex acts
T 0.418 -0.103 0.442
(0.335) (0.124) (0.281)
Mean of dep var in control 1.57 0.37 1.30
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Individuals) 1037 1037 1037
Survey to meeting attendees in both treatment and control villages. Dependent vari-
ables are individual responses to survey questions. (1) Number of sex acts, recalled over
past 7 days. (2) Number of condoms used, recalled over past 7 days. (3) Number of
unprotected sex acts over past 7 days calculated by subtracting (2) from (1). If this
difference is negative, we set the number of unprotected sex acts equal to 0. T =
respondent’s village is in treatment group. ρ = the relative reduction in HIV trans-
mission associated with antiretroviral drugs. True value: ρ = 0.96. Beliefs about ρ are
obtained from the survey using the infographic in Figure 4.4. The post-intervention
period is approximately 5 months. All regressions are OLS, at the individual level,
with individual-level controls, village-level controls and a constant. Individual-level
controls: age, gender, pregnant, married, has regular partner, employed, primary school
educated, secondary school educated, has livestock, has a brick house. Village-level
controls: Table 4.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and given in
the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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compared with the preventative strength of ART drugs. There would
need to be a minimum 25-fold increase in unprotected sexual activity to
offset the 96% reduction in HIV transmission associated with ART23.
5.2.7 Other Potential Mechanisms
We claim that the effects of the information experiment are due to a reduc-
tion in stigma towards HIV testing. However, other models may generate
similar predictions. For example, both social preferences and household
bargaining would predict an increase in HIV testing in response to new
information about the public benefits of ART drugs. We will attempt to
rule these out as first order explanations for our results.
Social costs are not the only potential barrier to HIV testing and treat-
ment. For example, the psychic costs of testing may be quite large. Oster
et al. (2013) propose an optimal expectations model to explain low uptake
of a medical test for Huntington’s Disease. This type of model, in which
individuals prefer to choose optimistic beliefs about the future rather than
learn the truth, may also partly explain low HIV testing rates. However,
such behavior is unlikely to be affected by information on the public
benefit of ART, conditional on the private benefits being known. For this
reason, we restrict attention to mechanisms which are plausibly linked to
our intervention through a social component of behavior change.
Social preferences
Altruism is an obvious alternative mechanism by which information on
the public benefit of ART might increase HIV testing. People may derive
utility from protecting their sexual partners from HIV. If this were the
primary mechanism, we would expect to see self-reported testing increase
in one’s own beliefs about the public benefits of ART, as opposed to the
beliefs of others. As shown in Table 5.5, this does not seem to be the case.
Additionally, while altruism may cause either nearby or far away testing
to increase, it does not explain the pattern observed in Table 5.4; high
of other sexually-transmitted infections which ART does not prevent. Gong (2014) and
Baird et al. (2014) find an increased risk of sexually-transmitted infection after a person
tests positive for HIV.
23Let τ be the HIV-transmission rate. The probability of avoiding infection in an
interaction with an HIV-positive person is 1− τ, or, if the person is taking ART, 1− 0.04τ.
We are interested in solving for the proportional increase in sexual interactions x which
equalizes risk: (1− τ) = (1− 0.04τ)x. For any τ ∈ (0, 1), this is solved by x > 25.
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beliefs about the public benefit of ART are linked specifically to nearby
testing.
This is not to suggest that individuals are not altruistic, or that altru-
ism does not play a role in HIV testing. It is plausible that a person who
is altruistic towards his partner is also less likely to be HIV positive, as
he might use condoms and have fewer concurrent partners. In addition,
an altruistic person may choose to test even without knowledge of the
public benefit of ART, in order to make informed choices about the risk
of transmitting the virus.
Household bargaining
Household bargaining has been shown to play a role in family planning
decisions (Ashraf et al., 2013). There are many reasons to believe that
HIV testing decisions are also subject to household bargaining, and this
suggests an alternative explanation for the increase in HIV testing we
observed. In particular, a person who is aware of the fact that ART
reduces HIV transmission may put greater pressure on her spouse to
get tested and treated for HIV. In this case, we would expect the testing
decision to be strongly linked to one’s spouse’s beliefs about the benefits
of ART. Table 5.5 shows that this is not the case.
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Table 5.7: Pressure to Test for HIV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% of pop-
ulation
joint
tested for
HIV
=1 if re-
spondent
tested for
HIV due
to
pressure
=1 if re-
spondent
would
prefer
joint
testing to
private
testing
WTP for
joint
testing
over
private
testing
T 0.111 0.005 0.003 -18.207
(0.108) (0.008) (0.016) (21.215)
Mean of dep var in control .3 0.01 0.77 111.36
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Individuals) 831 831 831
Obs (Villages) 119
(1) Administrative data from 18 health facilities in Zomba District. Dependent variable: % of village target population joint tested
for HIV post-intervention. Target population: age 15-49, non-pregnant. The target population was calculated from the Malawian
National Statistics Office census at the village level. The post-intervention period is 3 months. Regression is OLS at the village level,
with village-level controls and a constant. (2)-(4): Survey to meeting attendees in both treatment and control villages. Dependent
variables are individual responses to survey questions. Sample restricted to married respondents. The post-intervention period is
approximately 5 months. All regressions are OLS, at the individual level, and with individual-level controls, village-level controls
and a constant. Individual-level controls: age, gender, pregnant, married, has regular partner, employed, primary school educated,
secondary school educated, has livestock, has a brick house. (2) Respondent sought HIV test due to pressure. (3) Respondent would
prefer a joint test over private test. Sample restricted to married respondents. (4) Respondent’s willingness to pay for door-to-door
joint testing campaign vs. private testing (Malawi Kwacha: 400MK = 1USD). (1)-(4): T = respondent’s village is in treatment group.
Village-level controls: Table 4.1, population, nearest health center and community educator fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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A model of household bargaining would also predict an increase in
joint testing. A person has little to gain by putting pressure on her partner
to seek an HIV test if he is not intrinsically motivated to get treated. The
results of the test are private, and he can simply report a negative test
result. However, if a couple is tested jointly, the results are seen by both,
which means that each member of the couple can exert additional pres-
sure on the other to seek ART if necessary. Column 1 of Table 5.7 shows
that the effect of the information campaign on joint testing is insignificant,
and does not explain the overall increase in HIV testing. Survey results
indicate that treatment villages are similar to control villages in terms
of HIV tests reported due to pressure, preference for joint testing over
private testing, and relative willingness to pay for joint and private testing
(see Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5.7).
Household bargaining does not seem to explain the increase in HIV
testing we have seen as a result of the information campaign. It may
nevertheless play some role in HIV testing decisions. In both treatment
and control villages, most respondents report a strong preference for joint
testing, and approximately 20% of HIV tests in the clinic data are joint
tests. Those with enough bargaining power to pressure their partners to
test jointly may have already been motivated to do so before learning that
ART would protect them from transmission. For example, joint testing
allows couples to make informed decisions about condom use and family
planning, and form accurate expectations about the future.
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5.A Appendix: Equilibria
In this section, we characterize the pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equi-
libria of the model presented in Section 5.1. The signalling equilibrium, in
which a fraction S of the population rejects potential sexual partners who
have been tested, was analyzed in Section 5.1.2. Proposition 1 claims that
there is only one other type of equilibrium: a reverse signalling equilibrium.
5.A.1 The Reverse Signalling Equilibrium
For some parameter values, the game described in Section 5.1 has a
class of pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which a fraction P
of the population B consent only if their match has been tested, and the
remaining fraction 1− P consent to all matches. P must be large enough
to induce universal testing, because the equilibrium relies on extreme off-
equilibrium beliefs about those who do not test for HIV. Intuitively, high-
risk individuals have more to gain from testing, so it is not natural to
believe that a person who has not been tested is more risky than someone
who has. Nonetheless, this equilibrium satisfies the definition of a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium.
Fix P, and consider the strategy of each a ∈ A. He will not test far
away, as it is costly, and there is no benefit to hiding the decision since all
matches consent to those who test. His benefit to testing nearby is access
to ART drugs plus the guarantee that his potential sexual partner will
consent next period, θv(1+ δ) + δPya, and the cost is c. He will therefore
test nearby if
θv(1+ δ) + δPya > c.
High-risk types θ = θH will always test, because we assumed θHv(1 +
δ) > c.
The proportion of low-risk types who test is equal to
P (θLv(1+ δ) + δPya > c) . (5.16)
If this measure is less than one, that is, testing is not universal, then
this is not an equilibrium. To see why, consider the beliefs of b ∈ B. If
her match has not been tested, she concludes that his type is θ = θL. But
in this case, she will consent, because we assumed that everyone consents
to a person of average risk (assumption (5.6)), and therefore P = 0. This
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implies that for parameters such that
P (θLv(1+ δ) + δya > c) < 1
there is no reverse signalling equilibrium, because even if P = 1, that is,
everyone rejects those who have not been tested, universal testing will
not be achieved. Some low-risk types are not sufficiently motivated by
the prospect of a sexual relationship to bother seeking an HIV test.
Conversely, a reverse signalling equilibrium exists for any 0 < P ≤ 1
such that
P (θLv(1+ δ) + δPya > c) = 1.
All agents a ∈ A best respond to the strategies of agents B by testing
nearby. In this case, beliefs about a match who has not been tested (σa =
0) can take any value, as this action is off the equilibrium path. In order
to demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium, we set these beliefs equal
to θˆb(0) = 1 for all b ∈ [0, P] and θˆb(0) = 0 for all b ∈ (P, 1]. That is,
a fraction P of the population believe that a person who has not been
tested is HIV positive with probability one. The remaining fraction 1− P
believe that a person who has not been tested is HIV negative. In this
case, because it is never worth consenting to a match who is infected and
untreated, P(yb < sτ+ s0) = 1 (assumption (5.7)), all b ∈ [0, P] will reject
a partner who has not been tested. Meanwhile, because we have assumed
it is always worth consenting to an average-risk match (assumption (5.6)),
P(yb > 0) ≥ P(yb > h¯(sτ + s0)) = 1,
all b ∈ (P, 1] will consent to any match. In equilibrium, HIV testing is
universal.
5.A.2 Ruling out Other Equilibria
We have described two classes of equilibria. A signalling equilibrium is one
in which a fraction S ∈ [0, 1] of the population rejects matches who have
been tested for HIV, and otherwise all matches obtain consent 24. A reverse
signalling equilibrium is one in which a fraction P ∈ (0, 1] of the population
24We are including the case S = 0, in which all b ∈ B consent to any match, under
the title signalling equilibrium. Within this equilbrium, S = 0 describes the case in which
the cost of stigma is zero.
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rejects those who have not been tested, and otherwise all matches obtain
consent. We now describe and rule out other potential types of equilibria.
There is no equilibrium in which any agent rejects all matches
In the case of either universal testing or universal abstention from testing,
consistent beliefs on the equilibrium path will equal the average HIV
prevalence in the population: θˆb = h¯, and by assumption (5.6), b will
consent, because
yb > h¯(sτ + s0) > h¯(sτ(1− ρˆb) + s0).
Consider the case in which some agents test and others do not. Because
of random matching, all a ∈ A face the same expected cost of seeking a
test. However, high-risk types have more to gain. This implies adverse
selection among those who test, and those who do not test are therefore
lower-risk than the average member of the population. So, consistent
beliefs about those who do not test are θˆb(0) < h¯, and by assumption
(5.6), b will consent to those who do not seek an HIV test.
There is no equilibrium in which different agents adopt opposite strate-
gies towards matches who have been tested
We can now restrict attention to equilibria in which each agent b ∈ B
adopts a strategy of consenting to some or all matches. The signalling
and reverse signalling equilibria cover the cases in which some agents
always consent, and those who do not always consent all adopt the same
strategies.
The only other potential class of equilibrium is one in which different
agents b ∈ B adopt opposite strategies towards those who seek an HIV
test. That is, S > 0 and P > 0.
Suppose S > P > 0. In this case, all low-risk types will not test,
and some high-risk types may not either. Among those who do not test,
the average risk is less than that the average risk in the population, so
consistent beliefs are θˆb(0) < h¯. By assumption (5.6), all b ∈ B will consent
to those who do not test, so P = 0, which is a contradiction.
Suppose instead that P > S > 0. In this case, all high-risk types will
test, as the net cost of stigma is negative (S− P < 0). We consider two
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subcases. First, suppose this does not induce universal testing. That is,
P (θLv(1+ δ) + δ(P− S)ya > c) < 1.
Then any person who does not test is a low-risk type, so rational beliefs
are θˆb(0) = θL. By assumption (5.6), all b ∈ B will consent to those who
do not test, so P = 0, which again forms a contradiction. Instead, suppose
that this does induce universal testing, so
P (θLv(1+ δ) + δ(P− S)ya > c) = 1.
Now, rational beliefs about those who do seek an HIV test are θˆb(1) = h¯,
so by assumption (5.6) everyone will consent. This implies S = 0.
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5.B Appendix: Alternative Definitions of Dis-
tance
Throughout this thesis, we have defined a nearby test as an HIV test that
takes place at most four kilometers further than the nearest clinic to a
client’s home village. In this section we reproduce results on the choice
of testing location using different buffer zones around the nearest clinic.
Results with no buffer zone are shown in Table A1. In these tables,
we say an HIV test took place nearby only if it took place at the nearest
health facility to the village, as measured by GPS coordinates. Using
this definition, we see no significant link between beliefs about the pub-
lic benefit of ART and the number of nearby tests. This definition of
nearby is unsatisfactory as it does not take into account the fact that for
some villages, the nearest clinic as measured in travel time may not be
the same as the nearest clinic by GPS. Indeed, 61% of villages do not
have a single HIV test taking place at the nearest clinic during the pre-
and post-intervention periods combined. In addition, if a clinic is less
than a kilometer further than the nearest clinic, we should probably not
categorize that clinic visit as far away and claim that the choice is due to
stigma. On this margin, other factors such as wait time or quality may
play a larger role.
For the above reasons, a good definition of nearby should include a
buffer zone. Table A2 shows results with a buffer zone of two kilometers,
that is, a visit is considered nearby if it takes place at most two kilometers
further than the nearest clinic. This choice gives results that are quantita-
tively similar to those presented in the main specifications with a buffer
zone of four kilometers (Table 5.4).
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Table A1: The Effect of the Information Treatment on HIV Testing Location (no buffer zone)
% tested for HIV (IV) % tested for HIV (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Nearby Far Total Nearby Far
Average beliefs ρˆ in village 1.224** -0.343 1.567***
(0.540) (0.292) (0.508)
Proportion of village believes 0 < ρ < 0.95 0.518 -0.450 0.968
(0.647) (0.419) (0.603)
Proportion of village believes ρ ≥ 0.95 0.815 0.086 0.729
(0.698) (0.359) (0.649)
F-stat 171 171 171
Proportional increase in dep var 77% -44% 192%
Mean of dep var in control 1.6 .78 .81 1.6 .78 .81
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Villages) 119 119 119 119 119 119
Administrative data from 18 health facilities. Dependent variable: % of village target population tested for HIV post-intervention
far/nearby. Far clinics defined as >0km further than nearest free clinic. (1)-(3): 2SLS with T = treatment group as instrument
for beliefs. (4)-(6): OLS. ρ = the relative reduction in HIV transmission associated with antiretroviral drugs. True value: ρ = 0.96.
Community beliefs about ρ are approximated by the village-level average of beliefs, as obtained from the survey using the infographic
in Figure 4.4. Omitted reference category: % believe ρ = 0. Target population: age 15-49, non-pregnant. The target population was
calculated from the Malawian National Statistics Office census at the village level. The post-intervention period is 3 months. All
regressions are at the village level, with village-level controls and include a constant. Village-level controls: Table 4.1 and community
educator fixed effects. Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A2: The Effect of the Information Treatment on HIV Testing Location (2km buffer zone)
% tested for HIV (IV) % tested for HIV (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Nearby Far Total Nearby Far
Average beliefs ρˆ in village 1.224** 0.773 0.451*
(0.540) (0.509) (0.240)
Proportion of village believes 0 < ρ < 0.95 0.518 -0.073 0.591*
(0.647) (0.609) (0.345)
Proportion of village believes ρ ≥ 0.95 0.815 0.999 -0.185
(0.698) (0.604) (0.384)
F-stat 171 171 171
Proportional increase in dep var 77% 78% 74%
Mean of dep var in control 1.6 .99 .61 1.6 .99 .61
Village-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Villages) 119 119 119 119 119 119
Administrative data from 18 health facilities. Dependent variable: % of village target population tested for HIV post-intervention
far/nearby. Far clinics defined as >2km further than nearest free clinic. (1)-(3): 2SLS with T = treatment group as instrument
for beliefs. (4)-(6): OLS. ρ = the relative reduction in HIV transmission associated with antiretroviral drugs. True value: ρ = 0.96.
Community beliefs about ρ are approximated by the village-level average of beliefs, as obtained from the survey using the infographic
in Figure 4.4. Omitted reference category: % believe ρ = 0. Target population: age 15-49, non-pregnant. The target population was
calculated from the Malawian National Statistics Office census at the village level. The post-intervention period is 3 months. All
regressions are at the village level, with village-level controls and include a constant. Village-level controls: Table 4.1 and community
educator fixed effects. Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The cost of social stigma is significant for HIV positive individuals. It
forces many to seek treatment further than the nearest clinic, and prevents
others from seeking treatment at all. This carries a large personal cost, as
treatment greatly improves both quality and duration of life for people
living with HIV. It also carries a social cost, as ART drugs prevent HIV
transmission.
We find other barriers to treatment to be even more important. Our re-
sults suggest that reducing travel costs or improving clinic quality would
have a large impact on the uptake of ART drugs. However, as we demon-
strate, a policy to reduce stigma may be less expensive to implement than
a policy to reduce travel costs.
This study identifies a particular type of social stigma as a barrier to
HIV testing: statistical discrimination between potential sexual partners.
HIV testing disproportionately benefits those infected with the virus, and
is therefore a signal of underlying risk. An individual’s testing decision
may be observed by members of the community, and some community
members reject potential sexual partners who are known to have been
tested.
This example of statistical discrimination is based on misinformation.
Most are unaware of the fact that an HIV-positive person who is tested
and treated for HIV is much less contagious, due to the public benefit
of ART drugs. Providing information about the public benefit of ART
reduces stigma, and increases HIV testing by 60%. Villages with high
beliefs about the public benefit of ART drugs after the intervention see
a large increase in the number of HIV tests sought at nearby clinics, but
no increase in HIV testing at far away clinics. In addition, the testing
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decision appears to be based on perceptions of the community’s beliefs
about ART, and not one’s own beliefs. These results suggest that it is
possible to diminish this form of social stigma, by shifting the incorrect
beliefs upon which it is based.
If the increase in HIV testing we observed was indeed due to a reduc-
tion in stigma, the effect should persist. Uptake of ART drugs should also
increase, since the intervention consisted only of providing information
on their benefits. Future data will allow us to determine the long run
effect of this intervention on HIV testing and demand for ART. In addi-
tion, the theory suggests that the intervention targeted those who care
most about the number of sexual prospects. Individuals who prefer to
have many potential sexual partners are also most at risk of contracting
and spreading HIV. Long-run data on HIV incidence will allow us to
investigate the effect of the intervention on the spread of the virus.
This work may be relevant to other contexts in which a technology
is under-adopted due to stigma. In particular, if a technology dispro-
portionately benefits a stigmatized group, it may be under-adopted, as
individuals know it will signal their underlying type. For example, a per-
son who suffers from mental illness may be reluctant to seek psychiatric
care, for fear his friends or employer might find out. Stigma, in many
contexts, may be explained by statistical discrimination; employers might
believe that the mentally ill are less productive workers. This situation
leads to a bad equilibrium: the employee’s mental illness goes untreated,
and he is less productive than he would be if he were receiving treatment.
Of course, one solution is to help the employee obscure the signal, by
ensuring privacy of psychiatric care. However, if statistical discrimination
is based on incorrect beliefs, providing correct information to the public,
or in this example, to employers, should eliminate the stigma equilibrium.
A community-level information campaign on the public benefit of
ART drugs is an inexpensive way to reduce stigma and increase HIV
testing. A policy which reduces stigma directly is more attractive than
one which helps HIV test-seekers conceal their decision to test or their
motivation for testing. For example, while monetary incentives increase
HIV testing, in order to be effective in the face of stigma, they must be
paid repeatedly to the entire community. This might make monetary
incentives for ART use infeasible. A reduction in the level of stigma
should affect all health seeking behavior, and have permanent effects.
While our experiment took place in Malawi, there is reason to believe
its policy lessons apply elsewhere. Southern Malawi is representative of
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sub-Saharan Africa in many ways. HIV prevalence is high (above 10%),
ART drugs are widely available at rural clinics, and the population is
concentrated in rural villages, in which health seeking behavior is often
observable. Our model of stigma is based on rational behavior and does
not depend on cultural norms, therefore it might well apply in commu-
nities outside of our study area.
A scaled policy intervention should have two important features: in-
formation on the public benefit of ART should be provided at the community-
level, to ensure common knowledge, and the information should be pro-
vided in a credible way, for example, by trusted health authorities. It is
not sufficient to rely on learning and information sharing to shift beliefs
over time, because in the presence of stigma, both of these activities will
be hampered. Under-adoption of ART drugs means that most people do
not learn of their effects first hand, and stigma makes people reluctant
to discuss these effects with social contacts. Additionally, those who are
infected cannot transmit the information credibly, as they stand to benefit
from a shift in community beliefs about ART drugs. In the absence of an
information campaign, social stigma allows incorrect beliefs to persist.
Our results suggest that providing precise information on the effect of
ART drugs on HIV transmission is an effective way to reduce stigma.
Some public health campaigns aim to inflate perceptions of HIV risk
by distorting or hiding facts about transmission from the public, in an
effort to reduce risk taking. This study suggests that such policies may
have unintended consequences; they exacerbate stigma and inhibit health
seeking behavior. Informed communities have higher rates of HIV testing
and treatment, which improves the lives of those who are infected, and
serves the community as a whole by reducing the spread of the virus.
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